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ABSTRACT
Director:

Glynn D. Coates, Ph.D.

The purposes of this research were two-fold:

(1) to assess

the reliability and utility of the Aircrew Coordination
Observation and Evaluation scales in describing crew
coordination behaviors exhibited during flight and (2) to
investigate the effects of automation on crew coordination,
workload, and performance.

Two levels of automation (i.e.,

presence or absence of an autopilot) and two levels of task
difficulty (i.e., presence or absence of wind and
turbulence) were combined to yield a 2 x 2 design.

Twenty-

four two-person crews performed in both levels of automation
and one of two levels of task difficulty.

The results of

the reliability assessment demonstrated that the training
procedures and behavioral summary scale anchors that were
developed produced adequate levels of interrater reliability
in this investigation.

The results of the crew coordination

analyses revealed differences in the frequency and quality
of crew coordination behaviors between levels of automation.
Ratings of crew coordination were also shown to be related
to performance.

The results also indicated that although

crews in the automated condition reported less workload,
only one of the three measures of flight performance was
improved.

In addition, under high task difficulty, problem

solving performance was worse in the automated condition

i
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than in the manual condition.

Interpretation and

suggestions for future research are discussed.

ii
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1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Most successful operations in military and civilian
organizations stem from the integrated performance of
individuals making decisions within a team framework.

In

order to achieve team objectives, the teams are required to
coordinate their actions by sharing resources or
information.

Regardless of the organizational setting, the

basic assessment of teams has proven most difficult.

A

great number of variables must be sifted through in order to
pinpoint sources of a team's inadequacies and strengths, as
well as to allow realistic predictions of future levels of
achievement.

In addition to this complexity, these teams

frequently consist of individuals in remote locations
performing different tasks that must be combined in a
coordinated effort to accomplish their overall objectives
(e.g., air traffic controllers and aircraft pilots).
Over the past 40 years, considerable energy and
resources have been expended to determine the factors that
strengthen team performance, particularly within the
aviation context.

Researchers in military aviation have

been concerned with the enhancement of the coordinated
performance of teams as early as the 1950s (Hood, 1960;
Sherwood, 1953).

In these investigations, training content

and techniques were developed and evaluated to determine
more effective methods of increasing the mission
effectiveness of aircrews.

Similar research was continued
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during the 1960s in a series of investigations conducted to
identify key elements (e.g., task fidelity, training type,
system criteria changes, member replacement) that influence
the

performance of teams (e.g., Briggs & Johnston, 1966a,

b; Briggs & Naylor, 1965; Johnston, 1966; Naylor & Briggs,
1965).

All of these efforts focused on tasks that involved

the coordinated performance of individuals within teams.
The search for ways to enhance team performance has
continued more recently in the commercial air transport
industry.

Conclusions derived from research projects

(Ruffell Smith, 1979) and from commercial aviation accident
and incident data bases (Billings & Reynard, 1981; Lauber,
1980) have identified Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) as
an important ingredient in safe and efficient aircraft
operations. CRM is defined as the utilization of
information, equipment, and people as resources to achieve
safe and efficient flight operations (Lauber, 1980).

Over

the past decade, numerous programs have been instituted to
train aircrews to manage aircraft resources more
effectively.
The military also has begun to take another look at crew
coordination (i.e., another term for CRM used by the
military) as a means of enhancing safety and mission
effectiveness of flight.

A critical incident analysis of

Army aviation accidents indicated that poor crew
coordination contributes to poor flight safety (Thornton &
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Zeller, 1990).

In addition, experimental evidence obtained

from B-52 crews identified improved crew coordination as an
enhancer of performance on mission tasks (Povenmire,
Rockway, Bunecke, & Patton, 1989).

Although crew

coordination is not a new concept, renewed interest in crew
coordination as a moderator of aircrew performance has
changed the focus of team training research in the past few
years.

Initial studies (e.g., Krumm & Farina, 1960; 1962)

examined the effects of training aircrews within an
individual context in contrast to being trained in an
integrated context.

Current efforts are directed at

training crew skills above and beyond the individual skills
required for the mission (Bowers & Morgan, in preparation).
Another variable that has recently been considered a
moderator of team performance is the automation of
previously manually operated aircraft systems.

Automation

is frequently cited as an additional resource that requires
special management by the aircrew in order to maintain the
cockpit environment safely and effectively.

Because

automation affects the design and function of aircraft
systems, changes in the training of aircrews who operate
these systems are required.

The development of training

that includes a strategy for managing automation as a
resource appears to be a worthy aspiration for those
responsible for aviation safety; however, researchers must
first provide a more thorough documentation of the automated
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related changes in crew behaviors before instituting new
programs.
Automation has been conceptualized and defined by many
scientists (e.g., Fitts, 1951; Hess, 1987; Wickens, 1984).
Morgan, Herschler, Wiener, & Salas (in press) have expanded
the concept of automation to include its effects on team
performance.

They define human-centered automation "to

include (a) programmed electronic or mechanized support
systems which are under the control of system operators, and
(b) system-state information displays which permit effective
system management, facilitate interaction and transfer of
control among crew members and allow timely interventions
when degradation occurs."

Unfortunately, until the past

few years, the automation of support systems and displays
has been technology-centered, rather than human-centered
(Woods, 1988).

The technology driven focus on automation

(i.e., how to automate, not if to automate) has produced a
number of effects, not always positive, on the management of
aircraft flight systems.
The determination of whether automation actually
produces better performance than manual modes appears
inappropriate (Wickens, 1984).

Because arguments for and

against the benefits of automation can be advanced by using
different research findings, Wickens, Marsh, Raby, Straus,
Cooper, Hulin, & Switzer (1989) recommend examining other
variables that may interact with automation features.
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Workload and crew coordination are two such likely
moderators of performance.
Initially, the relationship between automation and
workload was assumed to be inverse; as automation increased,
the workload of the crew would decrease.

The acceptance of

this belief is shown by the 1982 Presidential task force
that endorsed the two-person cockpit in commercial aircraft.
The task force presumed that automation could sufficiently
replace the third crew member without increasing the
workload of the other two crew members (Wiener, 1985).

In

support of the move to the smaller aircrew, it must be noted
that only one major accident has occurred in the advanced
cockpit airframe since the implementation of the automated
crew member.

Sabotage, rather than human error in the

cockpit, has been hypothesized to be the cause of that
accident (Proctor & Mecham, 1991).

However, an inverse

relationship between automation and workload does not hold
true in all situations (Wickens, 1984).
Speculation about the exact relationship between
automation and crew coordination behaviors also has arisen
in relation to the safety and effectiveness of the flight.
The introduction of automation in flight systems has been
hypothesized to affect the manner in which the crew members
coordinate their activities (Norman & Orlady, 1988a).

In

addition, other researchers have expressed concern that the
automation of flight systems may produce unanticipated
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negative consequences in the overall performance
requirements for flight crews (Buley, 1985; Morgan et al.,
in press; Wiener & Curry, 1980).

To provide evidence for

these concerns, an experimental examination of the potential
moderating effects of automation on the workload, the
coordination behaviors, and the performance of the crew is
needed.
Other circumstances may also interact with automation to
produce differential effects on workload and coordination
behaviors displayed by the crew.

These include situations

which involve changes in the environment (e.g., decreased
visibility due to weather) or within the aircraft (e.g.,
engine failure). The crew must deal effectively with similar
circumstances to complete the flight successfully (e.g.,
land safely and on time).

Situations like these have been

used previously in experimental paradigms designed to
examine decision-making and planning behaviors in
experienced aircrews (Johannsen & Rouse, 1983; Oranasu,
1989).

Increases in the difficulty of the flight are made

by requiring additional or more complex responses from the
crews.

Such responses are also likely to change the

workload, crew coordination requirements, and subsequent
performance of the crew.
The current research examines the role of automation in
creating a new task structure with different requirements
for successful performance.

Specifically, the research
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explores the potential effects of automating the primary
flight controls in a low fidelity flight simulator.

The

ways in which automation may affect workload, coordination
behaviors, and crew performance are investigated.

Each of

these topics is discussed in the following sections.
The Individual in Automated Systems
The advent of the industrial revolution brought basic
changes to the design of jobs as a function of mechanization
and automation (Rosenbrock, 1983).

Task fragmentation

frequently occurred to the extent that human skills were no
longer central to the job; the principal role was given to
the machine.

The traditional approach to the allocation of

functions was to assign the human the remainder of the tasks
that could not be automated (Macek, 1982).

Combining the

leftover tasks into a single job often produced one
consisting of unrelated tasks.

Increased human mistakes and

decreased job satisfaction followed.

The automation of jobs

using this allocation approach defined the human role by
default.

The resultant breakdown in job cohesiveness

frequently created undesirable consequences for both the
individual and the organization.
As automation capabilities spread throughout various
industries, Bright (1958) posited changes in the work
requirements as a function of automation.

He noted a

general trend indicating that increasing levels of
automation tended to reduce the job content and the human
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contribution required (e.g., physical effort, training,
mental effort); however, he suggested that aviation was a
possible exception to his thesis.

Increased responsibility

for more systems, higher caliber duties, and new skills were
three factors expected to counteract the decreases in human
requirements found in automated industries.
Researchers during the 1960s verified that technological
changes frequently lead to changes in the job activities of
the individuals.

In actual investigations conducted in

factories, automation was found to increase the mental
demands of the job (Whyte, 1961), feelings of responsibility
(Mann & Hoffman, 1960) and pressure (Mann & Hoffman, 1960;
Whyte, 1961), and to decrease control (Blauner, 1964).
Increased automation was shown to affect workers in a number
of ways.
More recent analyses of automated systems (offices,
robotics, computer-assisted manufacturing, and process
control environments) also indicate evolving roles for the
individuals involved with these systems.

Czaja (1987)

reported that automation in the office affects the structure
and content of jobs leading to the routinization,
simplification, and fragmentation of jobs.

In addition,

office automation can decrease control over workload and
make current skills obsolete.

Bullinger, Korndorfer, &

Salvendy (1987) summarized the effects of robots on the work
force as follows:

(1) more psychological stress and less
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physical strain,

(2) decreased skills to operate equipment

and more skills to maintain and program equipment,

(3)

decreased direct control of activities and more indirect
activities such as monitoring, maintenance, repair,
different safety issues,

(4)

(5) and changes in the work

situations available to personnel (e.g., situation
determined by the tools rather than by the subject of the
work).

Similarly, when the effect of computerized

manufacturing automation on the workplace was examined in
four organizations (Office of Technology Assessment, 1984),
the automation was found to increase the need for skills
such as programming, monitoring, and maintenance, but
required less decision making and motor skills.

Boredom in

some jobs, safety from physical hazards, and stress also
increased.
As a final example, process control environments such as
nuclear power plants have also seen an evolution in the role
of individuals.

The human role has become one of

information processor and decision maker (Woods, O'Brien,
and Hanes, 1987).

When performing as a supervisor, "the

individual monitors and manages a partially self-controlling
process, handles the unexpected, and provides backup control
when automatic systems fail or when disturbances are beyond
automatic response capabilities" p.1738.

The human's

primary function becomes cognitive (e.g., setting goals,
solving problems); sensing is only a secondary function.
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Woods (1988) recently summarized the effects of
automation on the human's role based on field studies and
controlled studies from non-aviation industries
(computerized numerical control in manufacturing, banking
information systems and processes, steel processes, and
nuclear industries).

The studies were conducted to identify

the effects of technology on productivity and quality of
human performance.

When technology centered automation was

applied, Woods found that the human role in system
performance was altered in unexpected ways.

The patterns of

human skills were changed and the ability to adapt to
unanticipated variability became the critical human
function.

As a result, new error forms and types of system

breakdowns typically occurred.
The role of the pilot in increasingly automated cockpit
environments has also been altered in unexpected ways,
generating a host of accompanying problems.

Issues such as

complacency and inattentiveness (Miles, Miller, &
Variakojis, 1982), flexibility and vigilance (Wiener,
1987a), types and severity of errors (Bainbridge, 1987),
diffusion of responsibility between crew members and
aircraft systems (Farrell, 1987), training techniques
(Bohem-Davis, Curry, Wiener, & Harrison, 1983), and
maintenance of expertise and technical skills (Gannett,
1982) have been associated with automation in advanced
technology aircraft.

In some cases the problems may be
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related to poorly designed systems or improper training for
the aircrews.

In other cases, the problems are suggested to

be related to fundamental changes in the inherent role of
the pilot.
Analogous to process control operators, the role of the
pilot has shifted from that of a control manipulator to that
of a systems manager (Chambers & Nagel, 1985; Graeber,
1989).

Although the pilot retains responsibility for the

operation and safety of the aircraft, repetitive and mundane
tasks are performed by automated systems.

The role of

automation may be viewed as to provide assistance to the
aircrew in the performance of their tasks and in the
management of aircraft systems

(Norman & Orlady, 1988b).

Although automation plays a large role in controlling and
stabilizing the aircraft, automation should especially
support the aircrew in guidance, control, navigation and
systems monitoring.

In contrast, the basic pilot functions

are to "aviate, navigate, communicate, and operate" (Norman
& Orlady, 1988b, p. 139).

The maintenance of situation

dominance, an awareness of and control over the status of
the aircraft, is viewed as the central activity of the
pilot.
Norman & Orlady (1988c) argue that the fundamental role
of the pilot has not changed.

In accordance with Federal

Aviation Regulation 91.3, the pilot in command of the
aircraft is still directly responsible for and has final
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authority over the operation of the aircraft.

Regardless of

the machinery used, the pilot's primary role of monitoring
systems and flight path management is not altered, even
though some machinery can simplify or abolish the demand for
certain tasks (Norman & Orlady, 1988c).

Yet, it may also be

argued that the manner by which monitoring and managing must
transpire has been altered with the introduction of more
sophisticated systems.
The prevailing doctrine over the past 3 0 years
concerning the relationship of machines and humans has been
that automated devices should control systems and humans
should supervise and monitor the devices' actions,
intervening when necessary (Wiener, 1985; 1987a).

Wiener

notes ironically that the doctrine thus fostered places
humans in a predicament for which they are poorly skilled.
Monitoring is not a task in which humans are known to excel.
Speyer (1989) reports that vigilance research has shown
humans to be ineffective monitors, less likely to detect
system faults or incorrect setups, and more likely to commit
large blunders.
Yet, many traditional vigilance studies involve tasks
and subjects bearing little similarity to operational
aviation (Wiener, 1987a).

Robert, Hockey, & Tattersall

(1989) assert that the vigilance required to monitor
automated systems involves an active involvement in
searching, problem-solving, predicting, and planning in
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contrast to a passive involvement in receiving or detecting
signals typically demanded in earlier watchkeeping tasks.
The maintenance of vigilance in automated systems requires
participation from the individuals beyond that of
maintaining a state of perceptual readiness.
Indeed, it appears that the demands made on pilots in
automated systems are reflected in more than one area of the
flight task.

Additionally, different levels of effort for

various functions are required to preserve task performance.
During a workshop on flight deck automation and crew
coordination,

Norman & Orlady (1988a) concluded that flight

deck automation alters the actual structure of the flight
task in five areas:

systems operations, primary flight

control, navigation systems, checklists, and flight deck
communication.

As a result of automation, changes in task

structure affect the role of the pilots.

These authors

indicate that in automated systems, pilots monitor systems
less actively, perform less mental arithmetic, and use more
cognitive rather than motor skills.

The pilot flying

assumes more of managerial role; the pilot not flying
participates more in flight control, but less in the
monitoring of systems.

Changes in the flight task structure

also have implications for the aircrew as a team.
Teams in Automated Systems
Just as changes in task structure affect the role of
individuals by altering the behaviors required in the task,
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evidence suggests that it also compels changes in the
behaviors of teams.

Small group research conducted by

Sorenson (1971) found significant relationships between task
type (production or problem solving) and task behavior
(i.e., interaction processes such as structuring,
generating, elaborating, evaluating, and requesting
behaviors).

Further analyses suggested that different types

of tasks placed different demands on groups by
systematically altering the behaviors required to accomplish
the task.
The findings of research specifically designed to
examine the effects of technological change also indicate a
change in the working relationships among individuals.

For

example, increased automation decreased the opportunities
the workers had to interact with their coworkers (Whyte,
1961; Goodman & Argote, 1984).

In another situation,

Williams and Williams (1964) found that the introduction of
numerical control machines required more coordinating
activities between production and support personnel.
Automation in offices affected communication and interaction
patterns between workers and created perceptions of support
loss and distance from coworkers (Czaja, 1987).

Finally, in

a computerized manufacturing automation environment, Office
of Technology (1984) reported that interactions among
workers involved greater interdependence, collaboration, and
need for cooperation among workers.

Autonomy typically
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decreased.

As suggested by Zuboff (1981), changes in areas

such as information technology affect the relationships
between the people, the tasks, and the organization.
Small group and technological change research findings
are supportive of the observations made by Norman & Orlady
(1988a) regarding changes in interpersonal relationships and
procedures in advanced technology aircraft.

In addition to

changes in individual roles, changes have been observed in
aircrew interrelationships related to task structure and
cultural modifications.

More specifically, they reported

task structure changes that increased cross-check workload,
flight path control coordination, and more evenly
distributed workload between crew members.
also occurred.

Cultural changes

For example, although the captain and first

officer roles did not change, the individual roles of the
pilot flying (PF) and pilot not flying (PNF) did.
Specifically, the cultural changes included a more even
distribution of responsibility between PF and PNF with the
PNF assuming more responsibility and a reversed flow of
information between the PF and PNF.
These observations suggest that the processes by which
crew members interact in an automated setting differ from
traditional settings and merit further examination.
Although speculation exists regarding the nature of aircrew
interactions in advanced technology aircraft, little
empirical evidence has been gathered.

Wiener, Chidester,
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Kanki, Palmer, Curry and Gregorich (1991) are presently
conducting an investigation in operational aircraft to
examine differences in interaction requirements between
traditional and technologically advanced aircraft.
Hopefully, this and similar inquiries will shed some light
on the nature of any differences present.
In Sorenson's terminology, it appears that different
demands are placed on aircrews as a function of the new
behaviors required to perform the automated task.

The role

of teams in automated systems may center around changes in
the interaction behaviors and requirements that evolve from
modifications in the tasks being performed.

A relevant

concept, coordination demand, is described as "the extent to
which a given flight task paces a requirement (demand) for
the crew to interact, cooperate, or coordinate their
activities in order to accomplish the task" (Bowers, Morgan,
& Salas, 1991).

If crucial requirements for the successful

performance of teams are determined by the characteristics
and demands of the task which influence team interactions,
as Roby & Lanzetta (1958) suggested, accompanying changes in
crew training may be indicated after changes in task
structure and any resultant interaction behaviors are
identified.
Workload in Advanced Technology Aircraft
Pilot workload has been defined as "the cost incurred by
the human operators of complex airborne systems in
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accomplishing the operational requirements imposed on them"
(Hart, 1987, p.l).

This cost reflects a combination of

demands such as the mission requirements, the amount and
clarity of information and equipment provided, the flight
environment, and the pilots' skills, experience, adopted
strategies, exertion of effort, and emotional responses to
the situation.

An increasingly complex and variable

environment is presented to the aircrews with the
development of advanced technology aircraft, such as the
environment of the "glass cockpit".
The cost to an individual pilot for the operation of
flight systems is frequently evaluated as a dependent
variable in terms of mental workload.

Although physical

workload is much easier to define and measure in terms of
energy expenditure, the actual physical workload of a pilot
is not usually a concern in the advanced technology
aircraft.

Unfortunately, mental workload has no simple,

single definition or measure.

Individual, rather than team

workload, is typically measured.

The three most common

measures are defined according the manner in which workload
is measured:

subjective rating scales, secondary tasks, and

physiological measures.
Automation, probably more than any other factor, has
altered workload drastically, and may both decrease and
increase the workload of the crew.

For example, although

workload is reduced when automated devices perform tasks
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previously accomplished by the crew, the responsibility for
the operation of the device remains with the crew, thus
increasing their monitoring requirements.

In a related

field study conducted by Wiener (1989), pilots reported
sometimes turning off automatic features (e.g., of a flight
guidance system) and reverting to manual mode because of
their difficulty in managing the system during periods of
particularly high workload.

Wiener indicates that many

automatic features originally designed to decrease workload
are not reaching their potential because of software and
hardware problems.
Phase of flight and the presence or absence of system
failures or of other unplanned events (e.g., deteriorated
environmental conditions) also introduce different workload
levels to crews by changing the difficulty of their tasks.
The interaction of automation with these factors may
influence workload in unintended ways.

For example, flight

performance and subjective workload were found to be
affected differentially by the presence of automation,
emergency conditions, and crew composition (Wickens et al.,
1989).

Fifty aircrews flew a twin-seat GAT II flight

simulator either with or without autopilot controls both in
normal flight conditions and in conditions of system
failure.

Crews were divided into homogenous (i.e., similar

experience) and heterogeneous (i.e., dissimilar experience)
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groups.

Use of the autopilot resulted in better performance

and lower subjective workload.
However, a closer inspection of the workload measure
produced unexpected results.

When workload was analyzed

during system failures, automation produced differential
workload according to the composition of the crew.
Heterogeneous groups showed little increase in workload
between manual and automated conditions during system
failures; yet homogeneous groups showed a much greater
increase in workload when automation was present.

Thus, the

perception of workload level may not be affected
consistently by level of automation and crew composition.
Crew Coordination in Advanced Technology Aircraft
As with the concept of workload, no single, universally
accepted operational definition of crew coordination is
found in the literature.

When viewed as an interactive

behavior, it becomes difficult to describe, define, and
measure (Hall & Rizzo, 1975).

Turney, Cohen, & Greenberg

(1981) indicated that the operational definition of
coordination is determined by the context of the task
itself.

For example, Army aviation emphasizes the verbal

and behavioral responses in rotary wing flight in their
definition.

Crew coordination is defined as the interaction

between crew members (communication) and action (sequence &
timing) necessary for flight tasks to be performed
efficiently, effectively, and safely (Leedom, 1990).

One
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Navy definition emphasizes skills and resources, defining it
as an organized interaction of crew skills and resources for
the safe and effective conduct of flight (MacCuish & Morgan,
in press).

The central concept found in these definitions

is an interaction that has safety and effectiveness as its
goal.
Closely related concepts have been identified in
research conducted with Naval training teams.

Glickman,

Zimmer, Montero, Guerette, Campbell, Morgan, and Salas
(1987) identified taskwork and teamwork as the key
components of team performance.

Taskwork involves

individual, technical and operational skills needed to
perform the job tasks.

Teamwork is the component more

pertinent to crew coordination because it involves behaviors
that compose interdependence, coordination, and adaptation.
Teamwork is defined as "the set of values and behaviors
necessary for a team to achieve its common goals and to
adapt to the circumstances that it confronts in the work
environment" (McIntyre, Morgan, Salas, & Glickman, 1989).
Five essential elements are involved in teamwork:

the

group's self awareness as an intradependent unit, monitoring
team performance, providing feedback based on the
monitoring, communicating in a closed-loop fashion, and
backing up the actions of others.

Again, implicit in the

definition of teamwork is an interaction to achieve a common
goal.
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Krumm (1960) identified two perspectives from which crew
coordination is most frequently viewed:

a time-bound

synchronization of actions or a response improvisation.
When individuals involved in a common activity perform
adequately within a specified time period, a synchronization
of action occurs.

In this type of coordination, the

responses made by crew members are structured through the
use of formalized procedures (e.g., standard operating
procedures).

In contrast, when individuals involved in a

common activity perform as needed in problem solving
situations that have no immediate, prepackaged solutions,
response improvisation occurs.

In this type of coordination

crew members recognize and share crew problems and
objectives, maintain an awareness of others' responses and
responsibilities, and provide responses in recognition of
other's responses.

These two perspectives are reflected in

the distinction between established and emergent task
situations (Boguslaw & Porter, 1962).

Again, the task type

or structure appears to drive the coordination demands made
of the crew.
Approaches to crew coordination measurement.

Two

approaches to the measurement of crew coordination are
typically found.

The analyses of communication pattern and

content are often used as one approach to the measurement of
the coordination effort among crew members (e.g., Krumm &
Farina, 1962; Povenmire, Rockway, Bunecke, & Patton, 1989;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22
Thornton, Kaempf, Zeller, & McAnulty, 1991).

The analyses

of verbal communication is assumed to provide an assessment
of coordination interactions.
A second approach is to use trained evaluators to rate
performance on several dimensions of crew coordination.
Helmreich and Wilhelm (1989) developed a worksheet, Line
Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), for check airmen to
evaluate CRM in both simulators and aircraft.

This

evaluation tool is frequently used to assess crew
performance in training situations.
Another promising measure of crew coordination is based
on a series of investigations that identified and analyzed
the critical behaviors and subsequent behavioral dimensions
found to be crucial in the development of effective crew
coordination (Glickman et al., 1987; Morgan, Glickman,
Woodward, Blaiwes, & Salas, 1986; Oser, McCallum, Morgan, &
Salas, 1989).

Using this earlier research as a foundation,

a systematic, extensive review was conducted of crew
coordination programs, both commercial and military, the
tream research literature, and aviation data sources
(Prince, Salas, & Franz, 1990).

Behaviorally defined

management skills that were extracted from a review of the
management literature and skill behaviors identified for
team training were compared to skills previously identified
as important for crew coordination.

Franz, McCallum,

Lewis, Prince, and Salas (1990) identified 37 aircrew
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coordination behaviors that they categorized into the
following seven behavioral skill dimensions:

mission

analysis, decision making, assertiveness, flexibility,
leadership, communications, and situational awareness.
An examination of the criticality and frequencies of the
behaviors that compose the seven dimensions established the
utility of the behaviors (Franz, Prince, Cannon-Bowers, &
Salas, 1990).

In-depth interviews with 20 pilots from the

Naval helicopter community yielded 18 additional behavioral
examples of crew coordination.

Twenty-one job experts

verified the importance, difficulty and frequency of
occurrence of behaviors.

Revisions were made to reduce item

ambiguity, and the behaviors were administered to 134
additional job experts.

Finally, the behaviors were

classified independently by instructor pilots and aircrew
coordination researchers under the seven dimensions
previously indicated.

As part of this process and

revisions, the number of behaviors was further reduced to
42.

These final refinements permitted the development of

the Aircrew Coordination Observation and Evaluation (ACOE)
scale for use in the evaluation of crew coordination skills.
Prince, Chidester, Cannon-Bowers, and Bowers (1991) have
suggested that in spite of differences in equipment and
operations, enough similarity in coordination requirements
exists so that the skill dimensions included in the ACOE are
relevant to the behaviors of various types of aircrews.
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Although developed independently, these coordination skills
are similar to those recommended by the FAA for inclusion in
crew training, and have been shown to be related to skills
and behavior definitions ordinarily used in managerial
assessment (Maher, 1983).
Unfortunately, the potential of the ACOE to increase an
understanding of crew coodination has not been fully
realized.

A review of published research indicates limited

use of the scales in examining crew coordination issues
(e.g., Franz, McCallum et al., 1990; Franz, Prince, Baker,
Zalensny, & Salas, in preparation; Lassiter, Vaughn, Smaltz,
Morgan, & Salas, 1990).

In addition the reliability of the

scale has not been established at this time.

Therefore, an

opportunity exists to establish the utility of this measure
as a means of assessing crew coordination and its
potentially moderating effects.
Changes in crew coordination.

Crew coordination and

automation are no longer considered be two model-independent
concerns in aviation safety (Wiener, 1989).

Observational

and opinion data collected from pilots of high technology
aircraft by Wiener indicated that cockpit automation affects
crew coordination by influencing the way the automated
flight is managed.

Five main factors were reported to

affect CRM in these cockpits:

the physical difficulty of

seeing what the other crew member is doing, cross-monitoring
difficulties, a breakdown in traditional roles and
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responsibilities, a redistribution of authority, and an
increased tendency to assist others with programming during
periods of high workload.

Each factor alters the

interaction of the crews, and potentially, their flight task
performance.
Clothier (1991) has provided evidence that crews do
interact differently dependent upon the technology level of
the aircraft.

The data for her analysis were obtained from

a major domestic airline in both LOFT simulator missions and
on the flight line.

In LOFT simulations crews in advanced

cockpits performed better than those in standard cockpits.
In evaluations made on the line, CRM performance was better
in standard aircraft.

One year later, after all pilots had

completed CRM training, CRM performance remained better for
crews in advanced technology aircraft than those crews
operating in standard aircraft; however, no differences were
found between crews on the line.

The author suggested that

the advantage of advanced technology aircraft in the LOFT
scenarios was related to the extra time the technology
afforded the crews to utilize their knowledge in the
abnormal situations.
Further support for notion that crew coordination may
be altered in relation to the level of automation employed
is shown by an experimental examination of the relationship
of automation, crew composition, and communication.

Straus

and Cooper (1989) conducted a communication analyses on 24
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of the 50 crews who participated in Wickens et al.,

(1989).

The results indicated that more information exchange took
place in the automated condition.

Performance was better

for crews who made a higher ratio of task relevant to task
irrelevant statements.

Several types of communication and

performance measures were significantly correlated.

The

interactions between automation and crew composition were
not significant.

The preliminary results of this study

provided some evidence of a relationship between automation,
communication (i.e. crew coordination), and performance in a
flight task.
Regardless of the level of automation in the cockpit,
the need to maintain vigilance in aviation related tasks
indicates that the aircrew must remain actively involved
with the aircraft, the environment, and each other.
Unfortunately, a frequent criticism of advanced technology
cockpits is that the pilot may be placed out-of-the-loop,
thus increasing the difficulty of maintaining an up-to-date
awareness of and control over the aircraft's status.

The

maintenance of such knowledge provides the aircrew with a
basis from which to respond quickly and appropriately should
any emergency or abnormal situation occur.
Norman (1991) suggests that the current level of
intelligence for automated systems is inadequate when humans
must take over control of the system.

An absence of needed

feedback and interaction from the automated system during
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abnormalities in flight may prevent the aircrew from
effectively dealing with the situation.

Feedback and

diagnostic interaction would normally occur between the
aircrew.

If inappropriate forms of automation are indeed a

root problem, extra, joint effort on the part of the aircrew
to problem solve in the absence of automated feedback may be
required until design issues are remedied.
In addition, behaviors such as cross-monitoring,
assertiveness, and information exchange as taught in
traditional aviation settings may require readjustment to
prevent such problems as complacency and inattentiveness
(Foushee & Helmreich, 1988), diffusion of responsibility
between crew members and aircraft systems (Foushee, 1982) or
to prevent new and potentially more severe blunders from
occurring (McDaniel, 1988).

An aircrew may need to develop

something akin to a finely-tuned dynamic allocation of
function approach when interacting with each other and the
automated system in order to readjust the distribution of
tasks according to skill and processing load on an ongoing
basis during a flight.

Perhaps this is the area in which

specialized crew training may prove itself most useful.
Changes in the difficulty of a task may also introduce
changes in the coordination behaviors exhibited in flight
situations.

Although most training programs for

coordination skills assume that more coordination is better,
investigations of team performance by Naylor & Briggs (1965)
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and Williges, Johnston, & Briggs (1966) demonstrated that
increased communication under high levels of workload
interferred with performance.

However, this association

does not always hold true, as evidenced by Jensen (1962) and
Kinkade & Kidd (1959), and the relationship between task
difficulty and coordinaiton remains unclear.
Other research has illustrated that the task situation
itself may influence the effectiveness of the coordination
behaviors.

Kleinman & Serfaty (1989) conducted an

experiment in which two-person teams performed a
computerized resource allocation task.

Teams coordinated

their resources for maximum performance through computermediated communication.
to moderate levels,

As task demands increased from low

communication was utilized more

frequently; however, communication was reduced as the
workload (i.e., task difficulty) increased further, even
though subjects continued to transfer resources.

Only

communication, as a subset of coordination behaviors, is
typically examined.

Further exploration of the link between

task difficulty and crew coordination in flight situations
is therefore warranted.
Present Research
One purpose of the present research is assess the
reliability and utility of the ACOE scales in describing the
crew coordination behaviors exhibited during flight.

The

development of rater training procedures and the subsequent
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identification of satisfactory interrater reliability
provide initial support for the usefulness of this
instrument in the present and future research.
A second purpose of the present investigation is to
examine the relationships among crew coordination,
automation, and workload.

A review of the automation and

team performance literature suggests the need for an
organized research approach to delineate these
relationships.

An additional consideration is the

difficulty level of the task.

If differences in workload

and crew coordination behaviors can be distinguished as a
function of changes in level of automation and task
difficulty, guidelines for planning crew training schemes
may be developed.
Four contexts of task structure related to automation
and task difficulty may be devised producing a 2 x 2
factorial experimental design utilizing two levels of
automation (automated and manual) and two levels of task
difficulty (high and low).

Verification of the effects of

these variables on subjective workload, crew coordination,
and the flight performance of the crew is required before
attempting to recommend specific crew training.
Summary of Automation Hypotheses
The use of automation in the cockpit, as in other
automated environments, has introduced changes in the
structure of the tasks performed by the crew members (Norman
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& Orlady, 1989a).

In turn, these changes potentially alter

the performance, subjective workload, and coordination
behaviors of the crew members.

Although conflicting reports

exists as to the actual consequences of increased
automation, automation is designed ideally to improve
performance and decrease the workload of the crew.
Additionally, as the roles of the pilots are altered,
coordination behaviors may be expected to vary as a function
of automation level.

The use of automation may provide the

crew with more opportunities to coordinate their behaviors
and in some circumstances, increase the demand for
coordination.

Given the limited research literature

regarding the introduction of automation in the cockpit, the
following hypotheses are offered.
Hypothesis 1 :

The level of automation is hypothesized

to have an effect on the ability of the aircrew to perform
their flight tasks.

Crews in the automated condition

perform their flight tasks better than crews in the manual
condition.
Hypothesis 2 :

The level of automation is hypothesized

to influence the ability of the aircrew to develop an
optimal flight route.

Crews in the automated condition

develop more optimal flight routes than crews in the manual
condition.
Hypothesis 3 ;

The level of automation is hypothesized

to affect the subjective workload of the crew members.
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crews in the automated condition perceive less workload than
the crews in the manual condition.
Hypothesis 4 ; The level of automation is hypothesized to
affect the distribution of crew coordination behaviors
displayed by the crew.

Crews in the automated condition

display different coordination behaviors than those in the
manual condition.
Hypothesis 5 :

Automation level is not hypothesized to

affect the quality of the crew coordination displayed by the
crew.

The quality of crew coordination displayed does not

differ in relation to the level of automation available.
Summary of Task Difficulty Hypotheses
Although changes in the difficulty of a given task may
produce changes in performance, other consequences (e.g.,
decreases in workload or changes in coordination behaviors)
may provide additional information about the nature of the
task.

An examination of different levels of task difficulty

may be particularily useful if expected changes in
performance do not immediately appear. For example,
inclement weather, systems failures, or unplanned events
that can increase the difficulty of flight tasks may not
prevent an aircraft from reaching its destination.

However,

if the presence of these conditions is sustained over time,
changes in the workload of an individual may eventually
produce decrements in performance.
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Hypothesis 1:

The level of task difficulty is

hypothesized to affect the ability of the crew to perform
their flight tasks.

Crews in the low task difficulty

condition perform their flying tasks better than the crews
in the high task difficulty condition.
Hypothesis 2 :

The level of task difficulty is

hypothesized to affect the ability of the crew to develop an
optimal flight route. Crews in the low task difficulty
condition develop better flight routes than the crews in the
high task difficulty condition.
Hypothesis 3 :

The level of task difficulty is

hypothesized to affect the subjective workload of the crew
members.

Crews in the low task difficulty condition

perceive less workload than crews in the high task
difficulty condition.
Hypothesis 4 :

The level of task difficulty is

hypothesized to affect the distribution of crew coordination
behaviors displayed by the crew.

Crews in the low task

difficulty condition display different coordination
behaviors than those in the high task difficulty condition.
Hypothesis 5 :

The level of task difficulty is not

hypothesized to affect the quality of the crew coordination
displayed by the crew.

The quality of crew coordination

displayed does not differ in relation to the level of task
difficulty.
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II.

METHOD

In the present investigation, the crew coordination
performance, task performance, and workload of 48 crews were
assessed in a low fidelity aircraft simulation.

The

following sections describe the participants, apparatus, and
procedures used.

In addition, the development of the flight

scenarios, task performance and crew coordination measures
that were employed is also described in detail.
Participants
The participants were 96 students attending Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University (86 male and 10 female).
age of the participants was 20.
attained was 140.

The median

The median flight hours

All participants held a current private

pilot's license; 30 participants held more advanced ratings.
Participants received $10.00 for their involvement.

Ninety-

six students formed 48 crews of two individuals each.
Design
Two levels of automation and two levels of task
difficulty were combined to yield a 2 x 2 factorial design.
The level of automation was manipulated by the presence or
absence of an autopilot (i.e., automation or manual mode).
That is, when the autopilot is engaged in the navigation
lock mode, the airplane automatically maintains a
preselected altitude and flies directly toward a very high
frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR) radial.

Task

difficulty was manipulated by the presence or absence of
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turbulence and wind in the simulator scenario (i.e., high or
low task difficulty).
The flight task consisted of four variations:
manual-low difficulty,

(1)

(2) manual-high difficulty,

(3)

automation-low difficulty, and (4) automation-high
difficulty.

Each of the flight task variations were

examined by having 24 crews perform in both levels of
automation and one level of task difficulty.

The

participants were randomly assigned to one level of task
difficulty.
Apparatus
The low-fidelity flight simulation, Flight Simulator 4.0
(Microsoft), was employed for this investigation.

FIight

Simulator was modified by the manufacturer to provide flight
performance measures.

The software presents external visual

scenes above the instrument panel on the monitor (see Figure
1).

The aircraft configuration used was that of a Cessna

182-RG.

Only one navigation radio was provided.

The hardware configuration comprised:
Computer with two monitors,
microphones,

(1) a Personal

(2) three headsets with

(3) an audio system capable of combining

several channels of verbal communication,

(4) a mouse,

joystick, and (6) video recording equipment.

(5) a

A partition

separated the experimenter's station from the crew's
station.

A video camera placed above the experimenter's
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Outside View and Instrument Panel of Flight Simulator Configuration
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station was used to record the crews during the flight
scenario.

The camera was positioned to provide a distinct

view of the crews' faces and was connected to an audio/video
recorder.

Participants communicated with each other and the

experimenter via headsets with microphones. All utterances
transmitted on the intercommunication system were recorded.
Flight Simulator Task Separation
Flight Simulator is designed to be performed by one
individual using a keyboard, mouse, and joystick to fly the
simulator.

However,

participants in this research

performed the flight scenarios as two-person crews, with one
individual (the pilot) controlling the joystick and the
other (the copilot) controlling the mouse.

Control of the

keyboard could be assigned at the discretion of the pilot.
This division of tasks required the coordination of the
activities of both participants for successful mission
completion.
Simulated Flight Scenario Overview
Several criteria were used to develop the two flight
scenarios for this research project.

First, the scenario

was designed to present events that were likely to be
affected by crew coordination (e.g., events that would
require interaction between the crew members).

Second, the

scenario was designed to evaluate the crews' performance on
tasks for which they might reasonably be asked to perform
given an emergency situation.

Third, the scenario was
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designed to allow replication in different inodes of
automation.
The two scenarios that were developed involved flying
relief supplies to one of two types of disaster:
or gasoline pipeline rupture.

a tornado

The scenarios were similar

except for type of disaster, airfield names, and supplies
available.

The duration of each scenario was approximately

45-minutes.
The scenarios required that the crew work together to
obtain and deliver supplies to one of three disaster sites
(e.g., the tornado touched down in three locations).

Both

flying and navigation skills were required to obtain
supplies from different airfields.

The crew members could

share the responsibility of determining which supplies to
deliver and developing a flight plan to do so.

The

efficiency with which crew members performed their roles
influenced the accomplishment of the crew's overall
objectives.
The experimenter played the role of three control
centers (i.e., Tower, Center, and Operations) during the
scenario.

Tower provided clearance for takeoff and handed

off the crew to Center.

Center informed the crew of their

expected time of arrival (ETA) to each airfield check point.
Operations provided the crew with specific information and
instructions regarding the status of the disaster and their
overall mission.
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The crew had three primary flight tasks to perform
throughout the experimental scenarios.

First, they were to

maintain an altitude throughout the scenario as specified in
the premission briefing.

Second, they were to maintain the

course to each airfield check point as accurately as
possible.

Third, the crew were to reach each check point at

the appropriate time as instructed by Center.

A check point

was reached when the aircraft flew through a large box
placed in the air directly over the check point's VOR.

The

box was 1,000 feet wide and high; the center of the box was
located at 4000 ft.

Landing the aircraft was not required.

Mission briefing materials.

Both a written and a

prerecorded, verbal mission briefing containing the flight
requirements and details of the mission were presented to
each crew before the scenario began.

Appendix A contains

the mission briefing for the tornado scenario in the high
workload condition.

The briefing materials also included a

navigation map and a mission log (see Appendices B and C for
the tornado scenario).

The map was a quasi-low altitude

navigation chart that presented airways and VORs.

The

mission log provided the crew with information which, for
the most part, was also verbally presented to them by
Operations.

The contents of the log were not reviewed until

the crew received instruction from Operations.
Experimental scenario composition.

Each scenario was

divided into five flight segments that were conducted
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contiguously.

In the cockpit prior to takeoff, Operations

instructed the crew to record flight data (e.g.,
destinations, expected time of arrival (ETA), actual time of
arrival (ATA) on the form provided throughout the mission.
In addition, the crew was to rank individually the supplies
available for delivery in order of usefulness in providing
relief to the disaster scene.

They were given an

approximate departure time and a course for the first two
segments of flight.
The first flight segment was designed to give the crew
time to consider together the supplies that would be useful
in providing disaster relief and to become familiar with the
locations of the supplies.

Thus, Operations instructed the

crew to reach a consensus as to the ranking of the
usefulness of the supplies and provided the locations of the
supplies.
During the second flight segment, the crew received
further instructions about the specifics of their mission.
Operations informed the crew that they had time to pick up
four supplies and deliver them to one disaster site.

They

were to fly the designated airways only; if they flew over a
supply check point, a supply must be obtained.

The crew was

instructed to identify their first supply check point and
inform Operations of their decision two miles prior to their
present check point (i.e., Midway).

After the crew reported

their first supply check point, they were instructed to fly
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to a specific supply check point (i.e., Lewis) to pick up a
supply after reaching Midway.

The crew received this

instruction regardless of the first supply check point the
crew had chosen.
During the third flight segment, the crew was informed
which supplies were specifically needed at each disaster
site and the usefulness of the supplies in terms of the
supply's point value for that site.

Based on this

information, the crews were instructed to develop a flight
plan to pick up three additional supplies and deliver them
to a disaster site.

Additionally, they were to maximize the

number of points acquired, thus ensuring that the most
useful supplies would be delivered.
During the remaining two flight segments, four and five,
the crew was required to fly to the next two supply check
points that they had chosen and obtain the second and third
supply.

After they reached the third supply check point in

segment five, the scenario ended.

The crew was informed

that environmental conditions would preclude them from
continuing further and that the current supply point was
their final destination.

Appendix D presents an outline of

the script used by the experimenter for the tornado disaster
in the high difficulty condition.
Practice scenario composition.

Preliminary data

indicated that one hour of practice in the flight simulator
was sufficient for the aircrews to become familiar with the
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flight simulator, interactions with the control centers, and
the flight performance requirements.

The crew first

received a 15-minute introduction to the simulator
instrument panel and the controls required to fly the
simulator.

A list of crew responsibilities and checklist

procedures were provided to the crew (see Appendices E and
F).

The crew then flew a practice scenario, similar to the

experimental scenario, except for the requirement to obtain
and deliver supplies.

That is, during the practice

scenario, the crew flew from check point to check point,
maintaining an altitude of 4000 feet above ground level, and
calculating airspeeds needed to reach each destination on
schedule; however, the flight route was predetermined for
them and the need to make decisions about the course of
flight was not introduced.

The crew was instructed to work

as a team by assisting each other when possible.
Procedures
All flight data were collected over a period of 7 weeks.
Typically, two crews were observed each day, one crew during
a morning session and one during an afternoon session.
Participants were assigned a crew mate randomly; however,
the participants who indicated that they wished to perform
as a crew were so assigned.
Experimental sessions.

After completing an informed

consent form, each participant completed a demographic
information sheet (see Appendix G ) .

Participants were then

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42
randomly assigned either the role of the pilot or the
copilot.

Following the completion of the practice scenario,

participants flew the first experimental flight scenario.
After completion of the first scenario, participants
completed a subjective assessment of workload, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load Index (NASA
TLX) developed by Hart and Staveland (1988).

After a ten

minute rest break, the participants flew the second
experimental flight scenario and again completed the
workload assessment.

Finally, the participants responded to

a post-experimental questionnaire (see Appendix H) and were
debriefed by the experimenter.
Flight Performance
Summary values for each of the flight performance
measures were computed for each crew.
Altitude deviation.

The crews were instructed to

maintain an altitude of 4000 feet throughout the scenario.
The root mean square error (RMSE) for altitude deviation
from designated altitude was calculated in feet for
intervals of 15 seconds for each crew.
Course deviation.

The crews were required to remain on

the designated airways as closely as possible throughout
each scenario.

The RMSE for the deviation from designated

course was calculated in tenths of a mile for each 15 second
interval.
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Time deviation.

The crews were instructed to reach each

airfield check point at a specific time as determined by
Center.

Each ETA to the next check point was calculated by

adding a predetermined time in seconds to the time that the
crew actually passed over the airfield (ATA).

The measure

of performance was derived by calculating the absolute
difference between the crew's ETA and ATA.

The unit of

measurement was seconds.
Problem Solving Performance
Crews were instructed to obtain the most supply points
possible by flying over four supply airfields, using only
the airways shown on the map, and then delivering them to
one disaster site.
than once.

They could not fly over an airfield more

The total points possible for obtaining four

disaster supplies ranged from 0 to 17 and was dependent upon
the disaster site chosen.
Scores for problem solving performance were calculated
by summing the points assigned to the flight path chosen.
Higher points were indicative of better flight paths chosen
in terms of the usefulness of the supplies at a specific
disaster site.
Subjective Workload
The NASA TLX is the multidimensional rating scale that
was employed as the measure of subjective workload.

A

weighted average of ratings on six subscales provides an
overall workload rating.

These subscales are: Mental
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Demand, Physical Demand, Temporal Demand, Own Performance,
Effort, and Frustration.

The participants rated their

perceived exertion on five of these subscales (except Own
Performance) on a graded scale from "Low" to "High".
Own Performance scale ranges from "Good" to "Poor".

The
The TLX

was completed by each participant after each experimental
scenario.
Crew Coordination
An adaptation of the Aircrew Coordination Observation
and Evaluation (ACOE) scale (Franz et al., 1991) was used to
measure the frequency and quality of crew coordination
behaviors that were exhibited by crews.

The scale comprises

seven dimensions: leadership, mission analysis, situation
awareness, assertiveness, adaptability/flexibility, and
communication.
As previously discussed, the development of the original
scales has been documented by several authors (e.g., Prince,
Salas, & Franz, 1990).
two forms:

The original ACOE scale consisted of

(1) a checklist on which the frequency of

observed behaviors for each dimension and crew position are
noted, and (2) a form on which the quality of the observed
coordination behaviors for each dimension and crew position
is evaluated.

The rating scale anchors ranged from 0 (not

observed) to 5 (excellent).
Development of revised ACOE forms.

The format of both

the observation checklist and the dimension rating form were
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revised (see Appendices I and J ) .

Changes made to the

checklist were mainly cosmetic ones introduced for ease of
administration.

Only one behavior was eliminated from the

original ACOE checklist (i.e., "conveys information
concisely") because the behavior proved difficult to
operationalize in the experimental setting.
In an effort to assist raters in the assessment of
quality of crew coordination behaviors, behavioral
indicators of the skill levels were developed for each
dimension of crew coordination.

The behavioral indicators

were developed from specific behaviors observed during the
experiment and an examination of the dimension definitions
and knowledge, skills, and abilities required by the
dimensions (McCuish & Morgan, in preparation).

In addition,

discussions were held with personnel familiar with
coordination issues, including three pilots who participated
in pre-tests of the scenarios.

The pilots provided specific

feedback on effective and ineffective crew coordination
behaviors.

Two of the pilots reviewed and provided

additional feedback on the behavioral indicators and the
examples constructed.

Scores for quality of crew

coordination skill level for each dimension ranged from 1 to
5.

Behaviors were anchored at 1, 3, and 5 as indicators of

hardly any, adequate, and complete skill, respectively, in
the particular dimension.
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Rater training.

Two raters received 13 hours of

training related to the experimental scenario and the ACOE
forms.
aids.

Videotapes of three crews were used as training
Two of the crews had been excluded from the

experiment because of missing data; the third crew performed
only in the pilot-test.

The crews exhibited a full range of

skill levels in crew coordination.
Both raters had previous experience flying the
simulator.

Rater training began with the raters receiving

instruction on the simulator instrument panel and the
controls required to fly the simulator.
participated as a crew for one scenario.

The raters then
Afterward, they

and the experimenter reviewed crew responsibilities, mission
goals, and the critical events that could be expected to
occur during each segment of flight.
The seven dimensions of crew coordination were
introduced through a presentation of dimension definitions,
corresponding behaviors, and specific behavioral examples.
Examples of behaviors were then tied to critical events.
The behavioral observation form was introduced by first
explaining the procedure to note the frequency of behaviors.
The raters then recorded behaviors observed during each
flight segment of a videotaped scenario presented in 20
second intervals.

The experimenter provided feedback and

the behaviors were discussed for each time interval.
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The experimenter introduced the crew coordination rating
scale by reviewing the dimension definitions and then
explaining the procedure to rate the quality of crew
coordination exhibited.

Behavioral indicators of each

dimension and related behavioral examples were presented and
discussed (see Appendix K ) .

The raters individually rated

each crew member position on each dimension for the scenario
previously shown. After the raters discussed their initial
ratings with the experimenter, they made a final rating for
each crew member on each dimension.

The remainder of the

training involved practice in observation of crew
coordination behaviors and rating the behaviors observed in
the flight scenarios of the two remaining crews.
Rating procedures.

The two raters recorded the

frequency of crew coordination behaviors on the checklist
while observing the videotaped scenarios.

The raters then

used the behavioral summary scales to evaluate the quality
of the crew coordination behaviors exhibited by each crew
member for each dimension. As in training, these procedures
led to initial ratings of crew coordination by each
individual rater and then to final ratings of crew
coordination as a result of rater discussion.
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III. RESULTS
Overview
The interrater reliability of the crew coordination
measures are presented first.

The second and third sections

present the analysis of the performance for flight tasks and
the problems solving task.

The analysis of subjective

workload is presented in the fourth section, followed by the
analysis of crew coordination in the fifth section.

The

final section presents the analyses for the relationship of
performance and crew coordination.
Interrater Reliability of Crew Coordination Measures
The interrater reliabilities of the ACOE behavioral
observation checklist and the behavioral summary ratings of
crew coordination were calculated using the Pearson r
correlation.

Correlations were computed at the dimension

level (e.g., mission analysis, leadership) for each crew
position.
Observational checklist.

Interrater reliabilties for

frequency of behavioral observations of crew coordination
were computed for each crew position and dimension of crew
coordination.

The Pearson r values ranged from .917 to .993

(see Table 1).
Behavioral summary scales.

Interrater reliabilties for

the behavioral summary scales were computed for both initial
and final ratings for each dimension of crew coordination
and crew position. Interrater reliabilities of the initial
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ratings ranged from .540 to .851.

Interrater reliabilities

of the final ratings ranged from .912 to .991 (see Table 2).
Table 1
Interrater Reliability of Frequency of Behavioral
Observations for the Seven Dimensions of Crew Coordination
Pilot

Copilot

Mission Analysis

.986

.978

Situational Awareness

.950

.978

Decision Making

.974

.917

Leadership

.981

.963

Assertiveness

.959

.946

Adaptability/Flexibility

.943

.981

Communication

.984

.993

Dimension

Flight Performance
Flight performance data were collected and analyzed for
each crew by levels of task difficulty and automation.
Analyses of variance (ANOVA) with Tukey post hoc tests were
utilized for these analyses.

The data are summarized below

by flight task.
Course Deviation.

The crews were required to remain on

the designated airways as closely as possible throughout
each scenario.

A 2 x 2 (Task Difficulty by Automation)

mixed-design ANOVA was performed on the course deviation
data.

No effects were observed (see Table 3).
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Table 2
Interrater Reliability of Behavioral Summary Ratinas for the
Seven Dimensions of Crew Coordination

Dimension

Pilot

Copilot

.830
.960

.851
.958

.724
.980

.730
.978

.762
.991

.682
.962

.753
.983

.613
.960

.782
.971

.610
.951

.540
.912

.574
.920

.776
.980

.719
.942

Mission Analysis
Initial
Final
Situational Awareness
Initial
Final
Decision Making
Initial
Final
Leadership
Initial
Final
Assertiveness
Initial
Final
Adaptability/Flexibility
Initial
Final
Communication
Initial
Final
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Table 3
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Course Deviation

Source of Variation

df

Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.0008

0.00

Automation (A)

1

0.2748

0.89

A x D

1

0.1156

0.37

Subject (D) [S(D)]

34

0.3370

NT

A x S (D)

34

0.3105

NT

Mean Square

F

Eta Square

NT = no test.
Altitude Deviation.

A 2 x 2 (Task Difficulty by

Automation) mixed-design ANOVA was performed on the altitude
data.

The analysis yielded a main effect for task

difficulty, F(l,33) = 5.30, p < .05 (see Table 4).

Altitude

deviation in the high task difficulty condition (M = 368.34)
was significantly greater than in the low task difficulty
condition (M = 333.95).
A main effect was also indicated for automation,
F(l,33) = 17.21, p < .01.

The

mean RMS error for altitude

deviation in the manual condition (M = 371.46) was
significantly greater than in the automated condition (M =
327.88).

No other difference was found.
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Table 4
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Altitude Deviation

Source of Variation

df

Task Difficulty (D)

1

102702.8846

5.30*

0.00

Automation (A)

1

169756.6829

17.21**

0.00

A x D

1

4750.7226

Subject (D) [S(D)]

33

19394.2138

NT

A x S(D)

33

9861.4351

NT

* E < .05.

Mean Square

F

Eta Square

0.48

** g < .01; NT = no test.

Time Deviation.

A 2 x 2 (Task Difficulty x Automation)

mixed-design ANOVA was performed on the time deviation data.
The data set tended to be positively skewed; transformations
by log, reciprocal, and square root failed to provide any
increase in normality and power. Therefore, the analysis was
conducted on the raw data.

No significant difference was

noted (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Time Deviation

Source of Variation

df

Task Difficulty (D)

1

344.0118

0.07

Automation (A)

1

2.3059

0.00

A x D

1

2424.8941

1.08

32

5291.6669

NT

32

2247.2750

NT

Subject (D)
A x S (D)

[S(D)]

Mean Square

F

Eta Square

Problem Solving Performance
A 2 x 2 (Task Difficulty by Automation) mixed-design
ANOVA was performed on the flight path problem solution
data.

These data were calculated by summing the points

assigned to the flight path that was chosen.

Higher points

were indicative of better flight paths chosen in terms of
the usefulness of the supplies that could be delivered.
Because of the high negative skew in the supply solution
data, these data were transformed using a reflect and
inverse equation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989).

The

transformation increased the normality of the distribution,
but did not affect the significance of the results;
therefore, the original data are reported.
No main effect was found; however, there was a
significant interaction of automation by task difficulty,
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F(l,46) =5.67, p < *05.

A test for simple effects revealed

that in the high task difficulty condition, the flight paths
chosen in the manual condition (M = 15.89) were
significantly better than those chosen in the automated
condition (M = 13.77), F(l,46) = 4.53, p < .05.

The mean

problem solving scores and the source of variation are
presented in Tables 6 and 7.
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Table 6
Task
Source of Variation

df

Task Difficulty (D)

1

1.2178

0.07

Automation (A)

1

8.8741

0.92

A x D

1

54.8470

Subject (D) [S(D)]

46

17.3442

NT

A x S(D)

46

9.6675

NT

Mean Square

F

5.67*

Eta Square

0.04

* E < -05; NT = no test.
Table 7
Mean Problem Solving Score by Automation and Task Difficulty

Task Difficulty
High

Low

Automated

13.77
(4.38)

15.06
(3.55)

Manual

15.89
(2.44)

14.15
(4.04)

Automation8

Note.

Standard deviations appear in parentheses.

an = 48.
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Subjective Workload
A 2 x 2 x 2 (Task Difficulty by Position by Automation)
mixed-design ANOVA was performed on the subjective workload
data.

The analysis indicated a main effect of automation,

F(l,86) = 8.09, p < .01) and no significant interactions
(see Table 8).

Subjective workload, as measured by the NASA

TLX, was significantly higher in the manual condition (M =
58.41) than in the automated condition (M = 52.75).
Table 8
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Subjective Workload

Source of Variation

df

Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.2634

0.00

Position (P)

1

40.2596

0.09

D x P

1

20.4540

0.05

Automation (A)

1

1444.6307

A x D

1

8.3313

0.05

A x P

1

514.0214

2.88

A x D x P

1

97.6909

0.55

Subject (D X P)
[S(D x P) ]

86

447.3665

NT

A x S(D x P)

86

178.6422

NT

**

Mean Square

F

8.09**

Eta Square

0.03

E < .01.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57
Subscale analyses.

The subjective workload data were

analyzed further by conducting a 2 x 2 x 2 (Task Difficulty
by Position by Automation) mixed-design ANOVA on each of the
six TLX subscales.

Significant differences were found

within two workload subscales, physical demand and effort.
The analysis of the physical demand workload subscale
revealed two main effects of automation and position, F(l,
87) = 16.56, E

< .05, and F(l,87) = 33.23, E < *05,

respectively.

The mean physical demand workload in the

manual condition (M = 54.07) was significantly greater than
the automated condition (M = 39.12).

The mean physical

demand workload of the pilot (M = 55.49) was significantly
greater than the copilot's mean workload (M = 37.42).
The analysis of the physical demand subscale also
revealed a significant interaction of automation and
position, F(l,87) =25.48, e < -05.

A test for simple

effects indicated significant differences in physical demand
workload for position in the manual condition, F(l,140) =
58.47, e < *05.

The physical demand of the pilots (M =

69.46) was significantly greater than the copilots (M =
38.35) in the manual condition.

Also, physical demand for

the pilot differed significantly between the two levels of
automation, F(l,87) = 58.48, e < *05-

The mean physical

demand workload was greater for the pilot in the manual
condition than in the automated condition (M = 41.52).
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The analysis for the effort subscale revealed a
significant main effect of automation, F(l,87) = 7.11, p <
.05.

The perception of effort as a source of workload was

greater in the manual condition (M = 69.94) than in the
automated condition (M = 62.86).

The sources of variation

for the two workload subscales that were significant are
presented in Table 9.

Table 9
Summary of the Analyses of Variance for the Workload
Subscales of Physical Demand and Effort

Source of Variation

F

df

Mean Square

Task Difficulty (D)

1

1464.5071

Position (P)

1

14844.3312

P x D

1

67.4626

Automation (A)

1

10089.2773

A x D

1

776.8933

A x P

1

7735.2225

25.48**

A x D x P

1

818.2953

2.70

Subject (D x P)
[S(D x P)]

87

896.4413

NT

A x S (D x P)

87

303.5854

NT

Eta Square

Physical Demand
1.63
16.56**

0.11

0.08
33.23**

0.07

2.56
0.06

** P < .01.
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Table 9 (continued)
Summary of the Analyses of Variance for the Workload
Subscales of Physical Demand and Effort

Source of Variation

df

Mean Square

F

Eta Square

Effort
Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.0025

0.00

Position (P)

1

89.8657

0.13

P x D

1

0.4666

0.00

Automation (A)

1

2265.6351

A x D

1

44.1891

0.14

A x P

1

311.2873

0.98

A x D x P

1

33.8081

0.11

Subject (D x P)
[S (D x P) ]

87

706.7816

NT

A x S(D x P)

87

318.5257

NT

7.11*

0.02

* E < .05.
Crew Coordination
The crew coordination behaviors were analyzed in terms
of two measures: the frequency per minute of observed crew
coordination behaviors and the behavioral ratings of the
quality of crew coordination exhibited.
Frequency per minute of crew coordination behaviors. A
2 x 2

(Automation by Task Difficulty) mixed-design ANOVA was

conducted to identify differences in the length of the
scenarios among conditions.

A significant main effect was
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revealed for task difficulty, F(l,43) = 14.14, p < .01.

The

length of flight in seconds in the high difficulty condition
(M = 3530.02) was significantly longer than in the low
difficulty condition (M = 3270.59)
19 seconds longer).

(approximately 4 minutes

For this reason, the frequency data

were converted to a measure of frequency of crew
coordination behaviors per minute to overcome differences in
the opportunity to display coordination behaviors.
First, frequency data were obtained from the ACOE
behavioral observation checklist.

The frequency of

behaviors for each crew position was calculated by summing
the individual crew coordination behaviors within each
dimension for the entire scenario.
The frequency per minute was determined by summing the
frequency of behaviors occurring within each dimension and
dividing by the duration of scenario.

Frequency per minute

was calculated for pilot and copilot.

These data were then

submitted to the following analyses to identify differences
in the frequency per minute of coordination behaviors among
levels of automation and task difficulty and between crew
positions for each dimension.
A 2 x 2 x 2 (Automation by Task Difficulty by Position)
mixed-design ANOVA was conducted for each of the seven crew
coordination dimensions.

A significant main effect for

automation was revealed for mission analysis, F(l, 92) =
10.56, p < .01.

Mission analysis behaviors occurred more

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61
frequently in the automated condition (M = .052 per minute)
than in the manual condition (M = .040 per minute).

No

other difference was found for mission analysis.
A significant main effect for automation was also found
for decision making F(l, 92) =4.19, p < .05.

More decision

making behaviors were exhibited during the automated
condition (M = .019 per minute) than during the manual
condition (M = .016 per minute).

No other difference was

found.
A significant main effect for position was revealed for
situation awareness, F(l, 92) = 20.31, p < .01.

The copilot

displayed more situation awareness coordination behaviors (M
= .082 per minute) than the pilot (M = .041 per minute).

No

other difference was noted for situation awareness.
The analysis for the leadership dimension revealed
significant main effects of position, F(l,92) = 11.86, p <
.01, automation, F(l,92) = 19.43, p < .01.

The pilot

exhibited more leadership behaviors (M = .119 per minute)
than the copilot (M = .065 per minute).

Significantly more

leadership behaviors were exhibited in the automated
condition (M = .105 per minute) than in the manual condition
(M = .079 per minute).

A significant interaction of

position by automation was also indicated, F(l,92) = 24.79,
p < .01.

A test for simple effects indicated that the pilot

displayed significantly more leadership behaviors in the
automated condition (M = .148 per minute) than in the manual
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condition (M = .091 per minute), F(l,92) = 24.92, p < .01.
Additionally, the pilot displayed significantly more
leadership behaviors in the automated condition than the
copilot (M = .063 per minute), F(1,118) = 44.14, p < .01.
No other difference was observed for the leadership
dimension.
The analysis for frequency per minute of assertiveness
behaviors revealed a significant effect of position, F(l,
92) = 24.56, p < .01, and automation, F(l,92) = 6.59, p <
.01.

The pilot exhibited more assertiveness behaviors (M =

.142 per minute) than the copilot (M = .078 per minute).
Coordination behaviors for the assertiveness dimension
occurred significantly more frequently in the automated
condition (M = .117 per minute) than in the manual condition
(M = .102 per minute). A test for simple effects indicated
that the pilot displayed significantly more assertiveness
behaviors in the automated condition,

(M = .142 per minute)

than the copilot (M = .092 per minute), F(l,128) = 12.57, p
< .01.

The pilot also displayed significantly more

assertiveness behaviors (M = .141 per minute) than the
copilot (M = .064 per minute) in the manual condition,
F(1,128) = 30.20, p < .01.

In addition, the copilot

displayed significantly more assertiveness behaviors during
the automated condition than in the manual condition,
F (1,92) = 12.20, p < .01.
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A significant main effect of position was revealed for
the communication dimension, F(l,92) = 11.94, p < .01.

The

copilot displayed significantly more communication behaviors
(M = .486 per minute) than the pilot (M = .347 per minute).
An additional main effect, automation, was revealed for
communication behaviors, F(l,92) = 6.86, p < .01.
Significantly more communication behaviors occurred in the
automated condition (M = .436 per minute) than in the manual
condition (M = .396 per minute). No other significant
difference was found for the communication dimension.
Finally, the analysis for the adaptability/flexibility
dimension at the position level revealed no significant
differences.

The sources of variation for freguency per

minute of the seven dimensions of crew coordination are
presented in Table 10.
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Table 10
Summary of the Analyses of Variance for Frecruencv Per Minute
bv Dimension of Crew Coordination

Source of Variation

df

Mean Square1

F

Eta Square

Mission Analysis
Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.58

0.50

Position (P)

1

1.83

1.58

P x D

1

0.59

0.51

Automation (A)

1

6.67

A x D

1

1.05

1.66

A x P

1

0.61

0.96

A x D x P

1

0.00

0.01

Subject (D x P)
[S (D x P) ]

92

1.16

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

0.63

NT

10.56**

0.10

** E < .01.
1 Mean Square x 1000.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
Table 10 (continued)
Source of Variation

df

Mean Square1

F

Eta Square

Situational Awareness
Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.06

0.01

Position (P)

1

81.73

P x D

1

0.08

0.02

Automation (A)

1

0.02

0.02

A x D

1

0.08

0.09

A x P

1

1.49

1.58

A x D x P

1

0.29

0.31

Subject (D x P)
[S (D x P) ]

92

4.02

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

0.94

NT

20.31**

0.15

** E < .01.
1 Mean Square x 1000.
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Table 10 (continued)
Source of Variation

df

Mean Square1

F

Eta Square

Decision Makincr
Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.00

0.00

Position (P)

1

0.98

3.35

P x D

1

0.25

0.85

Automation (A)

1

0.55

4.19*

A x D

1

0.01

0.11

A x P

1

0.27

2 .05

A x D x P

1

0.02

0.12

Subject (D x P)
[S (D x P) ]

92

0.29

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

0.13

NT

0.01

* E < -05.
1 Mean Square x 1000.
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Table 10 (continued)
Source of Variation

df

Mean Square1

F

Eta Square

Leadership
Task Difficulty (D)

1

3.16

0.26

Position (P)

1

141.82

P x D

1

7.29

0.61

Automation (A)

1

33.61

19.43**

A x D

1

0.27

0.15

A x P

1

42.87

A x D x P

1

0.50

Subject (D x P)
[S(D x P)]

92

11.96

NT

A x S (D x P)

92

1.73

NT

11.86**

24.79**

0.10

0.02

0.03

0.29

** E < .01.
1 Mean Square x 1000.
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Table 10 (continued)

Source of Variation

df

Mean Square1

F

0.03

Eta Square

Assertiveness
Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.24

Position (P)

1

193.43

P x D

1

3.43

Automation (A)

1

10.52

A x D

1

0.49

0.31

A x P

1

9.05

5.67*

A x D x P

1

0.37

0.23

Subject (D x P)
[S (D x P) ]

92

7.87

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

1.60

NT

* E < •05.

24.56**

0.18

0.44
6.59**

0.01

0.01

** e < .01.

1 Mean Square x 1000.
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Table 10 (continued)

Source of Variation

df

Mean Square1

F

Eta Square

Adaotabilitv/Flexibilitv
Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.05

0.27

Position (P)

1

0.08

0.42

P x D

1

0.12

0.62

Automation (A)

1

0.16

3.31

A x D

1

0.12

2.44

A x P

1

0.16

3.27

A x D x P

1

0.01

0.17

Subject (D x P)
[S(D x P)]

92

0.20

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

0.05

NT

1 Mean Square x 1000.
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Table 10 (concluded)

Source of Variation

df

Mean Square1

F

Eta Square

Communication
Task Difficulty (D)

1

296.89

Position (P)

1

916.86

P x D

1

6.34

Automation (A)

1

77.12

A x D

1

0.27

0.02

A x P

1

34.88

3.10

A x D x P

1

0.44

0.04

Subject (D x P)
[S (D x P) ]

92

76.77

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

11.25

NT

3.87
11.94**

0.10

0.08
6.86**

0.01

** g < .01.
1 Mean Square x 1000.

Behavioral ratings of crew coordination dimensions and
overall crew coordination.

Ratings for the seven dimensions

of crew coordination were calculated by averaging the final
behavioral summary ratings of the raters for both pilot and
copilot separately.

These data were submitted to the

following analyses to identify differences between ratings
of crew coordination quality among levels of automation and
task difficulty and between crew position.
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A 2 x 2 x 2 (Automation by Task Difficulty by
Position) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted for each of the
seven crew coordination dimensions.

A significant main

effect for position was revealed for mission analysis, F(l,
92) =4.77, p < .03.

The mission analysis behaviors of the

copilot was rated significantly higher (M = 2.92) than the
pilot's rating (M = 2.60).

No other difference was found

for mission analysis.
A significant main effect of position was also revealed
for

situation awareness, F(l, 92) = 6.86, p < .01.

Again,

situation awareness of the copilot was rated significantly
better (M = 2.98) than the pilot's rating (M = 2.64).

No

other difference was noted for situation awareness.
A significant main effect of position for communication
was

revealed, F(l,92) = 6.54, p < .01.

As with mission

analysis and situation awareness, the communication of the
copilot was rated significantly higher (M = 3.16) than the
pilot's rating (M = 2.80).

An additional main effect,

automation, was revealed for communication, F(l, 92) = 5.73,
P

<

.02.

Coordination behaviors for the communication

dimension were rated higher in the automated condition (M =
3.04) than in the manual condition (M = 2.92).
A significant main effect of automation for decision
making was revealed, F(l,92) = 8.22, p < .01.

Coordination

behaviors for the decision making dimension received higher
ratings in the automated condition (M = 2.80) than in the
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manual condition (M = 2.65).

No other significant

difference was found for decision making.
The analysis for the leadership dimension revealed a
significant interaction of position by automation, F(l,92) =
7.87, p < .01.

A test for simple effects indicated that the

quality of pilot leadership was rated significantly higher
in the automated condition (M = 2.69) than in the manual
condition (M = 2.46), F(l,92) = 7.99, p < .01.

No other

difference was observed.
The analysis for the assertiveness dimension of crew
coordination revealed a significant effect of automation,
F (1, 92) = 5.51, p < .02.

Coordination behaviors for the

assertiveness dimension were rated significantly higher in
the automated condition (M = 3.05) than in the manual
condition (M = 2.94).
assertiveness.

No other difference was revealed for

Finally, the analysis of the

adaptability/flexibility dimension revealed no significant
difference.

The sources of variation for ratings of crew

coordination are presented in Table 11.
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Table 11
Summary of the Analyses of Variance for Dimension Ratings of
Crew Coordination Quality

Source of Variation

df

Mean Square

F

Eta Square

Mission Analysis
Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.0208

0.02

Position (P)

1

5.0052

4.77*

P x D

1

0.1302

0.12

Automation (A)

1

0.3333

1.56

A x D

1

0.1875

0.87

A x P

1

0.2552

1.19

A x P x D

1

0.2552

1.19

Subject (D x P)
[S(D x P)]

92

1.0497

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

0.2143

NT

*

E

<

*05.
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Table 11 (continued)

Source of Variation

df

Mean Square

F

Eta Square

Situational Awareness
Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.0469

0.06

Position (P)

1

5.6719

6.86**

P x D

1

0.1302

0.16

Automation (A)

1

0.0469

0.28

A x D

1

0.1302

0.79

A x P

1

0.6302

3.82

A x D x P

1

0.0052

0.03

Subject (D x P)
[S(D x P)]

92

0.8263

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

0.1651

NT

0.06

** E < -01.
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Table 11 (continued)

Source of Variation

df

Mean Square

F

Eta Square

Decision Makincr
Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.2552

0.30

Position (P)

1

1.6875

1.97

P x D

1

0.1875

0.22

Automation (A)

1

1.1719

8.22**

A x P

1

0.1875

1.32

A x D

1

0.0052

0.04

A x D x P

1

0.0208

0.15

Subject (D x P)
[S(D x P)]

92

0.8559

NT

A x S (D x P)

92

0.1426

NT

0.01

** E < .01.
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Table 11 (continued)

Source of Variation

df

Mean Square

F

Eta Square

Leadership
Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.8138

0.95

Position (P)

1

0.0117

0.01

P x D

1

0.0117

0.01

Automation (A)

1

0.2200

1.38

A x P

1

1.2513

7.87**

A x D

1

0.0326

0.20

A x D x P

1

0.0013

0.01

Subject (D x P)
[S(D x P)]

92

0.8537

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

0.1589

NT

0.01

** E < *01.
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Table 11 (continued)

Source of Variation

df

Mean Square

F

Eta Square

Assertiveness
Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.3333

0.50

Position (P)

1

0.0052

0.01

P x D

1

0.0833

0.12

Automation (A)

1

0.5208

5.51*

A x P

1

0.1875

1.98

A x D

1

0.0469

0.50

A x D x P

1

0.0469

0.50

Subject (D x P)
[S(D x P)]

92

0.6693

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

0.0945

NT

0.02

* E < *05.
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Table 11 (continued)

Source of Variation

df

Mean Square

F

Eta Square

Adaotabilitv/Flexibilitv
Task Difficulty (D)

1

0.1576

0.29

Position (P)

1

0.9492

1.75

P x D

1

0.2930

0.54

Automation (A)

1

0.0013

0.01

A x P

1

0.0638

0.56

A x D

1

0.1055

0.93

A x D x P

1

0.0326

0.29

Subject (D x P)
[S(D x P)]

92

0.5422

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

0.1133

NT
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Table 11 (concluded)

Source of Variation

df

Mean Square

F

Eta Square

Communication
Task Difficulty (D)

1

1.1719

1.27

Position (P)

1

6.0208

6.54**

P x D

1

0.0469

0.05

Automation (A)

1

0.7500

5.73*

A x D

1

0.0052

0.04

A x P

1

0.1875

1.43

A x D x P

1

0.0052

0.04

Subject (D x P)
[S(D x P)]

92

0.9204

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

0.1310

NT

0.06

0.01

* E < .05. ** e < .01.

Overall Rating of Crew Coordination Quality
Overall ratings of crew coordination quality for each
crew position were calculated by averaging the behavioral
summary

ratings across the seven dimensions of crew

coordination.

A 2 x 2 x 2 (Position by Automation by Task

Difficulty) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted on the quality
of crew coordination ratings.

The analysis revealed a

significant main effect of automation, F(l,92) = 5.80, e <
.05 (see Table 12).

The overall rating of crew coordination
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was higher in the automated condition (M = 2.85) than in the
manual condition (M = 2.77).
A significant interaction of automation by position was
also found F(l,92) =5.80, p < .05.

A test for simple

effects indicated that the overall crew coordination ratings
for the pilots were rated higher in the automated condition
(M = 2.80) than in the manual condition (M = 2.63), F(l,92)
=5.82, p < .02.

There were no significant differences

between the copilot ratings nor between the pilot and the
copilot.
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Table 12
Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Overall Rating of
Crew Coordination Quality

Source of Variation

df

Task Difficulty (D)

Mean Square

F

1

0.2552

0.47

Position (P)

1

1.8520

3.39

P x D

1

0.0086

0.02

Automation (A)

1

0.3215

5.80*

0.01

A x P

1

0.3215

5.80*

0.01

A x D

1

0.0038

0.07

1

0.0004

0.01

Subject (D x P)
[S (D x P) ]

92

0.5460

NT

A x S(D x P)

92

0.0554

NT

A

X

D

X

*

P

Eta Square

p < *05.

Task Performance and Crew Coordination
Two series of stepwise multiple regression analyses
were conducted using the measures of flight performance and
problem solving as the dependent variables.

The first

analyses investigated the relationship of the performance
measures with the observed frequencies of the seven crew
coordination dimensions for pilot and copilot.

The second

series investigated the relationship of the performance
measures with the behavioral summary ratings of the seven
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crew coordination dimensions.

These analyses were conducted

for both levels of automation.
Relationship of task performance and frequency of crew
coordination behaviors.

The frequencies of two crew

coordination dimensions were predictive of altitude
deviation (see Table 13).

The frequency of the copilot's

situation awareness behaviors accounted for 15% of the
altitude deviation variance in the manual condition.

As the

frequency of the copilot's situation awareness behaviors
increased, mean altitude deviation increased.

In the

automated condition, the frequency of the assertiveness
behaviors of the copilot predicted 10% of the variance.

As

the frequency of the copilot's assertiveness behaviors
increased, mean altitude deviation increased.
Analysis of mean course deviation in the manual
condition indicated a main effect for the frequency of the
pilot's situation awareness behaviors.

As the number of the

pilot's situation awareness behaviors increased, mean course
deviation increased.

No effect for frequency was found for

course deviation in the automated condition.

The regression

analysis for mean time deviation indicated no main effect in
either condition.
Analysis of the final dependent variable, problem
solving, indicated a significant main effect for the
frequency of the decision making behaviors of the copilot in
automated flight.

As the frequency of the copilot's
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decision making behaviors decreased, the problem solving
scores improved.

Table 13 provides a summary of the

significant effects of the regression analyses for frequency
of crew coordination behaviors.

Table 13
Stepwise Multiple Regression Analyses for Frequency Using
Mean Altitude Deviation. Course Deviation, and Problem
Solving as the Dependent Variables

Step

Multiple
R2

Final
Beta

F

df

8.22

1,46

5.23

1,46

6.66

1,46

4.81

1,46

Altitude Deviation
Manual
Situation Awareness
- Copilot

1

.152

.389
Automated

Assertiveness
- Copilot

1

.102

.319

Course Deviation
Automated
Situation Awareness
- Pilot

1

.126

.356

Problem Solving
Automated
Decision Making
- Copilot

1

.095

-.308
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Relationship of task performance and ratings of crew
coordination quality.

The variance of mean time deviation

was accounted for by ratings of crew coordination quality
during both levels of automation (see Table 14).

Ratings of

the pilot's mission analysis and leadership, and the
copilot's communication explained 25% of the variance for
time deviation in the manual condition.

Mean time deviation

increased in relation to increases in the ratings of the
pilot's mission analysis behaviors and to decreases in the
ratings of the copilot's communication and the pilot's
leadership behaviors.

Similarily in the automated

condition, ratings of the pilot's leadership and
assertiveness, and the copilot's communication explained 29%
of the variance for time deviation.

Again, mean time

deviation increased in relation to decreases in the ratings
of the copilot's communication and the pilot's leadership
behaviors; however, as the ratings of the pilot's
assertiveness behaviors increased, mean time deviation
increased likewise.
Altitude deviation was explained by ratings of the
pilots's situation awareness in the manual condition.
Better ratings of the pilot's situation awareness were
related to less mean altitude deviation.

No dimension of

crew coordination was predictive of altitude deviation in
the automated condition.
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Course deviation in the manual condition was explained
by ratings of the copilots's mission analysis (20%) ;
however, in the automated condition two dimensions of crew
coordination for the pilot explained 18% of the variance:
mission analysis and situation awareness.

In the manual

condition, increases in mean course deviation were
associated with poorer mission analysis behaviors of the
copilot.

In the automated condition, increases in mean

course deviation were associated with better mission
analysis behaviors of the pilot, and better ratings of
situation awareness for the pilot.
Finally, ratings of two crew coordination dimensions
for the copilot were predictive of problem solving:

the

copilot's situation awareness in the manual condition and
mission analysis in the automated condition.

In the manual

condition, better ratings of situation awareness for the
copilot were associated with better problem solving
performance.

In the automated condition, better problem

solving performance was associated with higher ratings of
mission analysis for the copilot.

These results are

summarized in Table 14.
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Table 14
Stepwise Multiple Regression Analyses for Rating Using
I_----- ■
*■•‘• " ‘— ■I..
___ ?
■*.*
the Dependent Variables

Step

Multiple
R2

Final
Beta

F

df

Time Deviation
Manual
Communication
- Copilot

1

.098

-.425

4.89

1,45

Mission Analysis
- Pilot

2

.177

.574

4.74

2,44

Leadership
- Pilot

3

.248

-.380

4.72

3,43

Automated
Communication
- Copilot

1

.119

-.470

6.24

1,46

Assertiveness
- Pilot

2

.198

.653

5.57

2,45

Leadership
- Pilot

3

.293

-.466

6.07

3,44

8.86

1,46

Altitude Deviation
Manual
Situation Awareness
- Pilot
1

.162

-.402
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Table 14 (concluded)

Step

Multiple
R2

Final
Beta

F

df

11.70

1,46

Course Deviation
Manual
Mission Analysis
- Copilot

1

.203

-.450
Automated

Mission Analysis
- Pilot

1

.088

.712

4.43

1,46

Situation Awareness
- Pilot
2

.183

.518

5.03

2,45

14.48

1,46

17.38

1,46

Problem Solvina
Manual
Situation Awareness
- Copilot
1

.239

.489

Automated
Mission Analysis
- Copilot

1

.274

.524
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire
A questionnaire administered at the end of the
experiment solicited the participants' opinions about the
experiment and their experience with cockpit resourse
management (CRM) training.

The participants indicated that

they felt the scenarios were moderately to very
representative of how aircraft might be used in response to
emergency situations (M = 5.23).

Both the flight

performance and the decision making requirements of the
scenarios were felt to reflect very accurately issues
important in aviation,
respectively).

(M = 6.14 and M = 6.05,

Additionally, the participants indicated

that the practice received during the training scenario was
very adequate (M = 5.87).
A related samples t-test was conducted between the
responses to Questions 5 and 6.

These questions asked about

the extent to which the participant became complacent during
the automated and manual conditions.

The participants

indicated that they were significantly more complacent (t =
8.09, p < .05) in the automated condition (M = 4.02,
"moderately complacent") than in the manual condition (M =
2.18, "somewhat complacent").

No difference was noted

between pilot and copilot in either condition.
The final two questions concerned the amount of CRM
training the participant had experienced previously.

Only

47% of the participants indicated they had received any
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previous training.

Chi-square tests for independence

revealed no relationship between CRM training for either
pilots or copilots and levels of task difficulty,

X2 = *49/

X2 = .06, df = 1, respectively, nor any difference between
crew position, x2 = 1*58, df = 1.
Summary
This investigation revealed an interesting, but complex
array of results.

The following sections provide a global

summary of the findings.
Interrater reliability.

Interrater reliabilities were

within acceptable levels for both the crew coordination
observation and behavioral summary scales.

Reliabilities

ranged from .917 to .993 for the observation scales and from
.912 to .971 for the final rating made on the behavioral
summary scales.
Crew coordination.

ANOVA results for the frequency per

minute of crew coordination behaviors indicated significant
effects as follows:

(1) a crew position effect for the

dimensions of situation awareness, leadership,
assertiveness, and communication,

(2) an automation effect

for the dimensions of mission analysis, decision making,
leadership, assertiveness, and communication, and (3) an
automation by position effect for leadership and
assertiveness.

ANOVA results for the behavioral summary

ratings of crew coordination quality revealed the following:
(1) a crew position effect for mission analysis, situation
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awareness, and communication,

(2) an automation effect for

decision making, assertiveness, communication, and overall
crew coordination.
The results of the regression analyses indicated that
several dimensions of the frequency of behavioral
observations and ratings of crew coordination behaviors were
predictive of task performance, although the dimensions
varied according to level of automation; however, the
behavioral ratings indicated a stronger effect than
frequency.

Altitude deviation was predicted by the

frequency of situation awareness of the copilot in the
manual condition and the assertiveness of the copilot in the
automated condition.

In the automated condition, course

deviation was predicted by the frequency of situation
awareness behaviors of the pilot; problem solving
performance by the frequency of decision making of the
copilot.
The relationship of task performance and the behavioral
summary ratings for crew coordination is summarized below.
Time deviation was predicted by ratings of the communication
of the copilot, and mission analysis and leadership of the
pilot in the manual condition, and by the communication of
the copilot, and leadership and assertiveness of the pilot
in the automated condition.

Altitude deviation was

predicted by ratings of the situation awareness of the
pilot.

Course deviation was predicted by ratings of the
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mission analysis of the copilot in the manual condition and
by the mission analysis and situation awareness of the pilot
in the automated condition.

Problem solving performance was

predicted by the situation awareness in the manual condition
and mission analysis of the copilot in the automated
condition.
Task performance.

The only flight performance measure

affected by level of automation was altitude deviation.
Altitude deviation was greater in the manual condition, and
also in the high difficulty condition.

Problem solving

performance was better in the manual high difficulty
condition than in the automated high difficulty condition.
Subjective workload.

The subjective workload reported

by the crews was lower in the automated condition.

In

addition, pilots reported higher physical demand workload in
the automated condition, and both crew members reported
greater effort as a source of workload in the automated
condition.
Opinion and experience data.

The participants

indicated a general level of satisfaction with the
representativeness of the scenarios, performance
requirements, and adequacy of the training.

They indicated

that they felt more complacent during automated flight.
No differences was found in the amount of CRM training
previously received by the participants.
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IV.

DISCUSSION

The purposes of this research were two-fold:

(1) to

assess the reliability and utility of the ACOE scales in
decribing the crew coordination behaviors displayed during
flight and (2) to examine the effects automation and task
difficulty on crew coordination, workload, and performance.
Two levels of automation were investigated:

an autopilot

that featured an attitude, altitude, and navigation hold and
no autopilot.

It was hypothesized that in the automated

condition, performance would be better, subjective workload
lower, differences in the frequency of crew coordination
behaviors would occur, and no differences would appear in
relation to the quality of coordination performance
exhibited.

Additionally, two levels of task difficulty were

investigated:

the presence of wind and turbulence and the

absence of environmental influences.

It was hypothesized

that performance would be better and workload would be lower
in the low task difficulty condition, differences in
frequency of crew coordination behaviors would transpire,
and no difference would appear in relation to the quality of
coordination performance exhibited.
Overview
An interesting pattern of results emerged from this low
fidelity investigation of automation.

The participants

reported less workload in the automated mode of flight.
Yet, flight performance, for all intents and purposes was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93
not enhanced to any great extent.

In addition, the flight

paths developed for the problem solving task were
significantly worse in the automated, high difficulty
condition than in the manual, high difficulty condition.
During the automated condition, crew coordination behaviors
occurred more frequently.

Also, crew coordination

performance was better for four of the seven dimensions and
for the overall rating of crew coordination.

Finally,

support for a relationship between performance and quality
of crew coordination behaviors was evidenced.

The following

discussion will examine these results in detail and
interpret them within the context of the hypotheses
previously generated and related research findings.
Flight Performance
Contrary to hypothesis and the past findings of Wickens
et al.

(1989), with the exception of altitude deviation,

automation had little effect on the three flight performance
measures.

Although the flight performance measures of

altitude, course, and time deviation were realistic in
relation to the specific requirements of the mission, the
latter two measures were perhaps too gross for a difference
in performance to be detected.

In addition, staying on

course and arriving on time appear to be more influenced by
factors outside of the direct control of the autopilot.
example, the autopilot has no direct link to the speed of
the plane, speed being under the control of the pilot;
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however, it could be argued that the use of the autopilot
could allow the crew members to pay more attention to the
calculation and adjustment of airspeed.

Likewise, although

the navigation feature of the autopilot enabled the aircraft
to lock on to the selected VOR, the observation of the
experimenter suggested that the benefit of this feature
appeared to be more governed by the method of its
utilization by the crews than was altitude.
It is also possible that the use of a higher level of
automation or several additional levels of automation, as
Sheridan's taxonomy of computer aiding (1991) outlines,
would have further delineated any effects of automation.
The use of other levels of automation, such as the system
offering advice but performing no actions, in addition to a
wider range of performance measures,

(e.g., severity of

errors, timeliness and accuracy of radio calls), may have
indicated performance differences not highlighted by the
current measures.
As found with the automation manipulation, altitude
deviation was also the only one of the three measures of
flight performance affected by task difficulty.

The wind

and turbulence present in the high difficulty scenario
appeared to increase altitude deviation over that present in
the low difficulty scenario.

This finding was anticipated

in light of the effects of turbulence on aircraft handling
in general.

However, the lack of a significant effect on
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course and time deviations may be related to the
participants' general aviation skill training.
Subjective Workload
The results of the NASA TLX analyses indicate that
subjective workload was perceived to be lower in the
scenarios in which automation was available.

A closer

examination of the workload subscales revealed that the
sources of workload affected by level of automation were
physical demand and effort.

The pilots reported more

physical demand when flying without the autopilot.

A

contrast between pilot and copilot responsibilities was
shown by the higher rating of physical demand made by the
pilots than the copilots in the manual condition.

These

results indicate that the autopilot achieved some of its
designed intent; that is, automation provided at least
subjective relief from some of the demands of the mission.
Individual participants, regardless of crew position,
indicated that their own effort, as a source of workload,
was lower in the automated condition.

This finding suggests

that even though the bulk of the physical demand fell on the
pilot, both crew members felt that they had to work harder
mentally and physically to accomplish their own level of
performance in the manual condition.
Analyses of the remaining workload subscales (i.e.,
temporal demand, mental demand, performance, and frustration
revealed no difference between level of automation for
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either crew position.

The absence of differences among

these subscales suggests again that the primary end of the
autopilot was a reduction in the physical demand placed on
the pilot and perhaps an overall reduction in the general
level of effort exerted by the crew.
No difference in subjective workload was found in
relation to task difficulty.

As with the measures of flight

performance, it appears that the wind and turbulence did not
sufficiently tax the skills of the crew members (pilots in
particular) to produce significant reports of workload
inequality between levels of task difficulty.
The automation effect on workload supports the stated
research hypothesis and the findings reported by Wickens et
al.

(1989).

Wiener et al. (1991), however, found the

opposite; that is, in a simulator study comparing a
traditional DC-9 and the glass cockpit of the MD-88, the
first officers, rather than the captains, reported more
workload.

In addition, the advanced technology crews

reported higher physical demand for the first officer and
higher frustration for both crew members.

The disparity in

results may be explained in part by the differences in the
amount of experience in the aircraft.

DC-9 crews had

significantly more time (i.e., both months and hours) in
their aircraft than did the crews in the advanced aircraft
(30.4 months vs 9.5).

The difference in the crews'

familiarity with flight systems and possibly in new task
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requirements placed on the first officer in the advanced
system suggest a possible bias on the basis of experience in
favor of the traditional cockpit.
Problem Solving
Automation did not produce better decisions about the
optimal flight path to take in either level of task
difficulty.

In fact, when wind and turbulence were present,

more optimal flight paths were developed during manual
rather than automated flight.

The failure of automation to

improve the flight path chosen is somewhat surprising,
especially in the higher difficulty setting where
automation, at first glance, would logically seem to be most
helpful.

Given the reported advantages of automation and

reduced reports of workload, this finding is intuitively
perplexing.

Because the crews experienced less workload in

the automated condition, one might hypothesize that more of
their "resources" would have been available for other
activities, such as planning and problem resolution.
This hypothesis is supported by the increased number of
mission analysis and decision making behaviors exhibited
during automated flight.

However, the occurrence of more

coordination behaviors did not produce better flight path
solutions.

And as previously noted, mental demand, such as

that might have been created by the need to develop a flight
plan to obtain and deliver the optimal supplies, showed no
apparent decrease in the automated condition.
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One viable explanation involves the notion of
complacency, which has been described as an attitude that
"modulates our probabilities in responding" (Wiener, 1981,
p. 118).

Complacency, defined as an attitude, is not

measured easily, does not necessarily produce observable
negative results, and therefore is most likely to be
measured only subjectively.

Wiener suggested that

complacency be viewed as "a conscious or subconscious
relaxation of one's usual standards in exercising judgement,
in selecting strategies, and in making decisions" p. 118.
Give consideration, then, to the automated condition in
which the aircraft generally required much less active
flying.

During this condition the workload derived

specifically from physical demand and overall effort was
decreased; in addition, the crews reported a higher degree
of complacency.

The resultant complacency, particularly

that which occurred

in the high task difficulty condition

as the autopilot handled a more difficult environmental
condition for the crew, may have placed the crews at risk to
accept less than optimal flight path solutions in spite of
an increased number of coordination behaviors.

(The

frequency of crew coordination behaviors is discussed in
more detail in the next section).
Anecdotal support for the complacency rationale is
frequently cited by researchers and pilots alike.

The

primary theme of complacency involves an individual or crew
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feeling familiar and perhaps overly comfortable with a
situation, sometimes to the detriment of the situation.

The

analysis of the problem solving task, in conjunction with
reports of lower workload and higher complacency, provide
additional evidence of the potentially debilitating effects
of complacency.
Crew Coordination
Many have contended that the nature of coordination may
differ among increasingly automated flight systems because
of the changes that automation impose on flight tasks, and
eventually on the roles and interactions of the crew
members.

This contention is supported by one of the more

notable findings of this investigation that demonstrates a
difference in the frequency per minute of coordination
behaviors observed between levels of automation.

Crews

during automated flight exhibited a higher frequency of
coordination behaviors of mission analysis, decision making,
leadership, and communication.

Apparently energy (i.e.,

resources) not spent in direct control of the aircraft was
directed to more overt interaction between crew members.

In

contrast, crews in manual flight displayed almost no
decrease in overall flight performance, but significantly
less coordination behaviors.
Kleinman and Serfaty (1989) reported similar results
when examining adaptive team coordination strategies.

Under

low to moderate levels of workload, team members coordinated
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their actions and resource sharing in an explicit manner.
However as workload increased, performance was maintained,
but the coordination strategy changed to an implicit one in
which crew members responded to unsolicited reguests for
assistance and communication was greatly reduced.
The lack of performance differences in light of the
increased coordination behaviors may be partially explained
by the conclusions of Williges, Johnston, & Briggs (1966).
After noting divergent effects of communication on team
performance, they suggested that when a task does not
require, but rather allows communication, then crew
communication may seem "little more than an unnecessary and
rather tempting luxury that has relatively little impact on
teamwork" p. 477.

Similarly, if automated flight permitted

the opportunity for more coordination behaviors that were
not essential for the maintenance of safety and performance
standards, the increase in coordination behaviors may have
been superfluous.

It is conceivable that the level of

automation present in this investigation permitted more
explicit coordination behaviors, when possibly only implicit
behaviors were needed.
Brown, Boff, and Swierenga (1991) bring a slightly
different perspective to the explanation for increased
coordination behaviors in the automated condition.

They

suggest that if automated systems reduce control actions
(e.g., pushing or pulling), the implicit communication of a
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crew member's present knowledge and intent to other crew
members may also be reduced.

Therefore, it may be

hypothesized that more explicit coordination behaviors may
be needed in increasingly advanced cockpits to convey the
information that was previously conveyed by a push, pull, or
a look.
Other differences in the distribution of coordination
behaviors occurred in relation to crew members.

In support

of Norman & Orlady's (1988a) proposal concerning changes in
the role of pilots, the pilots in this investigation assumed
more of a managerial role as shown by increased leadership
behaviors (i.e., directing, organizing, and supporting) in
the automated condition.

Additionally, copilots became more

assertive, taking a more active role in offering unsolicited
opinions and admitting uncertainty during automated flight.
Differences between the ratings of crew coordination
quality were also observed, although none was hypothesized.
When differences were noted, the ratings favored the
automated condition.

Coordination behaviors displayed

during automated flight were rated higher for the dimensions
of decision making, assertiveness, and communication.

The

overall rating of crew coordination quality also revealed a
higher rating in automated condition; however, only the
pilots received significantly higher overall ratings.
These results are somewhat contrary to the report of
Wiener et al. (1991) who found that overall CRM performance
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was either the same or slightly higher (dependent on the
rater) in the traditional aircraft. Again, differences in
time in aircraft may have biased those findings.

In

contrast, Clothier (1991) found that CRM performance was
better in advanced technology aircraft when LOFt scenarios
were used.
Although differences between the coordination behaviors
of the two crew members were not hypothesized, the analysis
of the frequency per minute and rating of crew coordination
behaviors indicated differences in the responsibilities of
the individual crew members.

Regardless of the level of

automation, the copilot displayed more situation awareness
and communication behaviors than did the pilot, and the
pilot exhibited more assertiveness behaviors.

In the

automated condition only, the pilot displayed more
leadership behaviors than the copilot.

Surprisingly, the

copilot received higher coordination ratings than the pilot
for situation awareness, mission analysis, and communication
behaviors across conditions.

These results suggest that

some of the responsibilities of the crew members may remain
stable and the copilot may be in a better position to
display overt coordination actions regardless of automation
level.
Performance and Crew Coordination
The analysis of the relationship between frequency of
crew coordination behaviors and task performance indicated
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that the frequency with which crew coordination behaviors
occurred explained small, but significant amounts of
variance in the performance measures.

Three coordination

dimensions (e.g, the number of the copilot's situation
awareness behaviors) were significantly predictive,
explaining 10 to 15% of the variance of three of the four
performance measures.

However, in this investigation it

appears that the increased frequency of situation awareness
and assertiveness behaviors were indicative of deviations in
flight performance and thus perhaps were performance-driven
behaviors, as Straus & Cooper (1989) suggested in their
analysis of communication frequency.

Likewise, the negative

relationship of the frequency of decision making behaviors
of the copilot and problem solving scores suggests that the
decision making behaviors may have been symptomatic of
difficulties in determining the most optimal flight path.
The analysis of the ratings of crew coordination
indicated a stronger effect on task performance than did
frequency.

Quality ratings of coordination accounted for 16

to 29% of the variance in performance. Unfortunately,
explanations for the direction of the relationships are not
intuitive.

For example, task performance was typically

negatively associated with ratings of crew coordination
behaviors for the pilot, but was positively associated with
ratings for the copilot.
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In the manual condition, the crew coordination
performance of the copilot was positively associated with
task performance; that is, better communication and mission
analysis with improved flight performance and better
situation awareness with improved problem solving
performance.

It appears that if the copilot was able to

keep abreast of mission and flight status and provide timely
information to the pilot, both flight and problem solving
performance were enhanced.

In contrast, only leadership

ratings for the pilot were positively associated with flight
performance in the manual condition; ratings of mission
analysis and situation awareness behaviors for the pilot
were negatively associated.

The exhibition of mission

analysis and situation awareness behaviors on the part of
the pilot may actually have been in response to deviations
in flight performance rather than preventative behaviors.
Another explanation for the negative relationship of pilot
ratings and flight performance may be related to the burden
of the physical demand placed on the pilot in manual flight.
The extra efforts made by the pilot, other than to provide
directive behaviors, may have contributed to deteriorated
flight performance by overtaxing the resources available to
the pilot.
In the automated condition, flight performance was
positively associated again with ratings of the copilot's
communication, and problem solving performance with ratings
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of the copilot's mission analysis.

Flight performance was

negatively associated with ratings of the pilot's mission
analysis, situation awareness, and also assertiveness.

The

results in automated flight suggest that the higher ratings
that the pilot received were related to an awareness of
flight deviations rather than an overload.
These results provide some evidence of the changing
structure of the flight task across levels of automation as
hypothesized by Norman & Orlady (1989a).

During the manual

condition, the crew dealt essentially with two tasks:
controlling the aircraft and planning an optimal route of
flight.

In this mode of flight, the primary responsibility

of the pilot was to keep the aircraft aloft.

Planning a

route of flight to obtain and deliver supplies was typically
a task relegated to the copilot in light of the physical
demand placed on the pilot.
In contrast during automated flight, tasks were
reallocated among the crew members and the system.

The

autopilot assumed the moment-to-moment control of the
aircraft, freeing the pilot to perform other tasks as less
attention was focused on the direct control of flight.
Although problem solving was a task that was generally
handled by the copilot in the manual condition, the pilot
was more available to share in the development of the flight
plan in automated flight.

Unfortunately, this reallocation

of tasks did not produce better problem solutions in the
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automated condition, perhaps because of the diffusion of
responsibility noted earlier by Farrell (1987).

In this

situation, a lack of clearly defined duties may have
obscured the potential benefits of automation.
Summary
The results of the present investigation add to a
complex pattern of results found in the aviation literature.
Although automation generally is assumed to reduce the
workload of crews, a reduction that was accomplished in this
investigation, the decreased workload that was associated
with automatic flight did not consistently improve
performance on flight tasks or in the development of an
optimal flight path to obtain and deliver supplies.

In

addition, the manipulation of task difficulty produced fewer
effects than hypothesized.

It may be that the benefits of

automatic systems are apparent only in the case of more
extreme workload levels in which manual control is more
difficult to maintain over time.

These results are

consistent with the mixed results of previous research
findings derived from higher fidelity flight simulations
(Wickens et al., 1989; Wiener et al., 1991) and other
experimental data (Ephrath & Curry, 1977; Fuld, Liu, &
Wickens, 1987; Young, 1969).
The hypotheses concerning crew coordination received
some support.

The hypothesis regarding the distribution of

crew coordination behaviors was partially confirmed in that
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several dimensions of crew coordination behaviors occurred
more frequently in relation to the level of automation.

The

most remarkable difference between the two conditions is the
increased frequency of coordination behaviors observed in
the automated condition.

It appears that any "saved"

processing resources afforded by the automatic flight
condition may have been invested in more frequent
communications.

Also, in support of the findings of

Clothier (1991), crew coordination performance was also
better in the automated condition.

It may be that the

automated condition provided more of an opportunity or
perhaps a requirement for the crew members to coordinate.
Efforts to identify the coordination behaviors that
were associated with task performance met with limited
success.

The frequency of coordination behaviors predicted

a few small, yet significant amount of variance in the
performance measures.

However, the ratings of crew

coordination performance demonstrated more predictive power
than did frequency.
In summary, the results of the present investigation
demonstrate the complex relationship between automation,
workload, performance, and coordination.

Several additional

conclusions that may be drawn from this study are discussed
below.
First, the utility of the ACOE to discriminate between
coordination behaviors was shown; that is, interrater
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reliability for the observations and ratings of crew
coordination behaviors were demonstrated.

Because the

nature of aviation tasks may change even more as a function
of increasing advanced technology systems, it is possible
that advanced aviation systems may require special behaviors
not assessed by current crew coordination measurement
instruments.

Efforts should be made to identify other

behaviors more specific to advanced cockpits.
Second, the results of the present investigation
converge to illustrate the utility of low fidelity
simulation to assess the effects of automation on crew
coordination.

The use of a low fidelity simulation produced

results comparable with higher level simulations; however,
the generalizabilty of the findings to more advanced
technology aircraft is unknown.

It must be noted that these

data are derived from a simulation that employed only one
automatic system.

Advanced aircraft currently employ

increasing levels of flight control, in addition to
integrated data displays and intelligent systems.

It is

necessary then to replicate these results in either higher
fidelity simulations or actual aircraft to assess their
generalizabilty.

Additionally, it is unclear whether

results obtained with one type of automatic system
generalize across levels of automation.

The investigation

of a range of automated systems would provide more
information.
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Third, a related concern is the measurement of flight
performance in advanced systems.

Traditional performance

measures (e.g., course deviation) may be less useful in the
study of advanced technology aircraft.

Performance

parameters must be identified and validated to allow
researchers to differentiate between effective and
ineffective or acceptable and unacceptable performance in
these systems.
Fifth, the manipulation of task difficulty in this
investigation was an environmental one because of the
limitations of the software.

Other characteristics of the

flight task may need to be altered to investigate the
effects of automation more closely.

Kantowitz and Casper

(1988) have suggested comparisons of regular vs irregular
operations.

The introduction of system failures or abnormal

conditions (e.g., snow closing an airport) would provide
additional situations in which to assess performance and
coordination in aircraft with higher levels of automation.
Sixth, manipulations of the reliability of the
automation may shed additional light on the interactions
among crew members and system.

Parasuraman, Bahri, Molloy,

and Singh (1991) reported that complacency and its
performance consequences in system monitoring were related
to the reliability and consistency of the automation.

Such

a manipulation in the investigation of advanced aircraft
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systems may identify guidelines for system reliability as
well as for crew training to deal with unreliability.
Finally, a thorough analysis of the interface between
pilot and system is recommended before comparing automated
aircraft in relation to reduction of workload and
improvement of performance, or even crew coordination.
Reports of the mixed consequences of automation may be
related to poorly designed system interfaces.

A closer

examination of the interfaces may clarify performance
differences.
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Premission Briefing
OVERVIEW
During this flight scenario, you will be performing as
two off-duty military officers responding to a civilian
disaster.

You will by flying a Cessna 182RG.

While serving

as an emergency rescue and supply aircrew, your mission is
to pick up and deliver supplies to a disaster site.

Your

aircraft is currently located at the end of runway 27 at the
O'Hare airport.

During your mission you will be interacting

with 3 controlling agencies: the tower, center, and
operations.

The frequency for the tower is 119.1.

frequency is 132.5, and Operations is 119.25.

Center

Operations

will provide you with specific information regarding the
disaster.
To be prepared for this mission, you should have the
aircraft's checklists, the area map, a flight plan log, a
flight computer, a mission log, and pen or pencil.

Do not

advance in the mission log until you have been instructed by
Operations.
DISASTER SUMMARY
Initial reports indicate that a tornado has touched down
at three locations in your flight area.
Spring Brook, Kankakee, and Fair Oak.
has been declared for each locality.
civilians have been affected.

These sites are
A state of emergency

Several hundred

No fatalities have occurred,

but some injuries have been reported.

As an emergency
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rescue and supply aircrew, your mission is to pick up and
deliver supplies to one of the three disaster sites.
Current reports indicated that airports located near these
sites are open and unaffected.
There are eleven airfields between Midway and the
disaster sites.

Each airfield has one specific supply.

You

will be notified of what supply is located at each airport.
PROCEDURES
A supply is picked up from a supply point or delivered to
a disaster site by flying through the box located over the
airfield.

This box is 1000' square and the center of it is

located at 4000' MSL.

You cannot fly over an airfield

without picking up a supply.

Furthermore, you may only fly

the airways depicted on the map.

For example, you cannot

fly directly from O'Hare to Frankfort without flying over
other airfields.

Since time is critical, Center will

provide you with specific times your are to arrive at each
supply site.

Unfortunately, because of time and aircraft

limitations, it is unlikely that all supplies can be picked
up.

To ensure that the most valuable supplies reach a

disaster site, it is important that you give consideration
to the usefulness of the supplies before departure.

Upon

arrival in the cockpit, call Operations for further
instructions.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132
WEATHER
Flight service reports weather south of Midway to be clear
with moderate turbulence at 4000'.
at 20.

Winds at 4000' are 210

O'Hare altimeter is 30.01.

PERFORMANCE
Your crew's performance will be assessed by determining
how well you maintained 4000', followed the airways shown,
and reached your points at assigned times.

Performance will

also be assessed by determining the utility of the supplies
you delivered.
Do not advance in the mission log until instructed by
Operations.
cockpit.

Your actual flight planning will be done in the

Contact Operations on 119.25 for further

information as soon as you arrive in the cockpit.

If you

have any questions, please ask them now.
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Individual Supply Ranking
Record supplies in order of their usefulness.
(1 = least useful; 11 = most useful)
Supply
1.

2

.

Rank

first aid kits________________ ____
water

____

3.

flashlights___________________ ____

4.

food_______________________________

5.

blankets

____

power generators

____

7.

drugs

____

8.

tents

____

9.

chainsaws

____

10.

water purifiers

____

11.

ropes

____

6

.

DO NOT TURN PAGE UNTIL INSTRUCTED
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Aircrew Supply Ranking
Record ranks according to aircrew agreement.
(1 = least useful; 11 = most useful)
Supply

Rank

1.

first aid kits________________ ____

2.

water

____

3.

flashlights

____

4.

food

____

5.

blankets

____

6.

power generators

____

7.

drugs

____

8.

tents

____

9.

chainsaws

____

10.

water purifiers

____

11.

ropes

____

Supply
1. first aid kit

Frankfort

7.

drugs

Lansing

2. water

Crown Point

8.

tents

Seneca

3. flashlights

Lewis

9.

chainsaws Twin Peaks

4. food

Hobart

5. blankets

Aurora

6. power generators

10.

water purifiers Joilet

11.

ropes

Charlotte

Yorkville

DO NOT TURN PAGE UNTIL INSTRUCTED
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REMEMBER
Airfields between Midway and the disaster sites have
only one supply.
Supplies are picked up by flying through the box over
the airfield.
Only 4 supplies can be picked up for delivery to a
disaster site.
You may only fly the airways indicated on the map.
If you fly over a supply airfield, you have picked up a
supply.
Report next destination to Operations 2 miles prior to
Midway. Then contact Center for clearance.
DO NOT TURN PAGE UNTIL INSTRUCTED
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SUPPLIES USEFUL AT EACH DISASTER SITE
**** The number beside each supply denotes the point value
of that supply for a particular disaster site.
Kankakee

Fair Oak

Sorincr Brook

6

drugs

6

ropes

6

drugs

5

first aid kits

5

blankets

5

first aid kits

4

blankets

4

chainsaws

4

blankets

3

flashlights

3

drugs

3

flashlights

2

water

2

first aid kits

2

tents

1

food

1

flashlights

1

water

REMEMBER
Deliver 4 supplies to one disaster site.
Higher the number, the more useful the supply ( 0 - 1 7
points possible).
If equal supply points, choose shorter flight path.
Report next destination to Operations 2 miles prior to
Lewis. Then contact Center for clearance.
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Script for Controlling Agencies for Tornado Disaster,
High Difficulty Scenario
Operations

We have sketchy information about the

disasters at this time. Bad weather is currently dictating
the first 2 legs of your mission so that it's important that
you get off the ground soon and be heading in the general
direction of the supplies and disasters.
OHare to Meigs and then on to Midway.

First, fly from

Maintain 4000 feet

and remain on the designated airways as closely as possible.
After completing the initial route, you'll be responsible
for determining which supplies you pick up and developing a
flight plan to deliver them.

We'll provide you with

additional information as we receive it.

The flight plan

attached to your mission log should be completed for each
destination throughout your mission.

Now, take a few

minutes to begin individually ranking these supplies in
order of their usefulness in providing disaster relief.
These supplies are listed on page 1 of your mission log.
rank of 1 is most useful; a rank of 11 is least useful.
Your time is limited so do not discuss your rankings with
your crew mate at this time.

You'll be provided with an

opportunity to do so after departure.

Complete your

checklists and expect departure in six minutes at approximately _____ .

Do not miss your departure time.

Contact Tower for clearance at that time.
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Tower

1FS, O'Hare Tower, winds 210 at 20, altimeter,

30.01.

Upon departure, climb runway heading to 1500'.

Cleared for takeoff.

Begin secondary task by pressing any

key on the keypad.
SEGMENT 1 - OHARE TO MEIGS
Tower (1200 ft)

1FS, Tower.

AUTOPILOT) FLIGHT.
Center

Remember, this is a MANUAL (OR

Contact Midland center 132.5, Good Day.

1FS, Midland Center, Radar contact, resume own

navigation.

Climb and maintain 4000'.

arrival time at Meigs is _________ .
119.25.

Your expected
Contact Operations on

Report back on.

Operations

1FS, Operations. We have an update for your

mission on page (2) of your mission log. Because you aren't
going to be able to carry all the supplies needed for this
mission, both of you must decide which supplies are most
useful.

After reaching an agreement, record your crew's

ranking in the mission log.

Also shown is a listing of the

locations where the supplies are located.

We'll contact you

as soon as we have more information as to the status of the
disaster areas.

Monitor Center frequency for expected time

to MIDWAY.
SEGMENT 2 - MEIGS TO MIDWAY
Center
.

1FS, Center. Your expected arrival time at MIDWAY is
Operations is requesting you contact them for a

mission update.

Report back on.
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Operations

1FS, Operations.

Looks like you only have

enough time to pick up 4 supplies.

Therefore, you must

develop a flight plan to pick up and deliver 4 supplies to
any one of the sites.

Remember, your mission involves

acquiring and delivering the most useful supplies as
possible, in addition to reaching each airfield at the
appropriate time.

However, you may only fly the airways

shown on the map.

Furthermore, you may not fly over an

airfield without picking up a supply.

Report your next

destination to us 2 miles before reaching MIDWAY.
miles prior to MIDWAY.

Repeat, 2

Then monitor Center for time to your

next destination. If you need a review of these
instructions, Page 3 of your mission log provides one.
[After call about destination]
Operations

1FS, Operations.

We're currently receiving

reports about the severity of the damages at each disaster
site and the supplies actually needed.

After reaching

Midway, proceed to LEWIS for a pick up of FLASHLIGHTS.
We'll provide additional information to you as we receive
it.

Contact Center with Lewis destination.
SEGMENT 3 - MIDWAY TO LEWIS

Center 1FS, Center. Understand destination ______ .
expected arrival time at LEWIS is _________ .
Operations for mission update.

Your

Contact

Report back on.
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Operations

1FS, Operations.

We've just received a list of

priority supplies needed at each individual disaster site.
Page 4 in your mission log indicates each disaster site and
the usefulness of the supplies needed in terms of point
values.

The higher the number, the more useful the supply

at that site.

If a supply isn't listed, that indicates the

supply is of no value at that site.

Given this information,

your mission is to deliver a group of four supplies to a
disaster site and obtain the most points possible.
Acquiring the higher point values ensures that the supplies
that arrive can be used.
from 0 to 16.

The sum of obtainable points range

In the event that you are able to obtain an

equal number of supply points from two flight paths, you
should choose the shorter route.

Inform us of your next

destination two miles before you reach LEWIS.

Then contact

Center for the expected time to your next destination.
Operations

1FS, Operations.

Understand destination ______ .

Contact Center with next destination.
SEGMENT 4 - LEWIS TO 2ND SUPPLY
Center

1FS, Center.

Understand destination ______ .

expected arrival time is __________ .

Your

Confirm with

Operations next destination 2 miles prior _____ .

Report

back on.
Operations

1FS, Operations.

Understand destination -

Contact Center with next destination.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

146
SEGMENT 5 - 2nd SUPPLY TO 3RD SUPPLY
Center

1FS, Center. Understand destination _________ .

Your expected arrival time is __________ .

Confirm with

Operations next destination 2 miles prior _____ .

Report

back on.
Operations
_______ .

1FS, Operations.

Understand destination -

Contact Center with next destination.
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CHECKLIST PROCEDURES

CESSNA - MODEL R182

BEFORE STARTING ENGINE
1.

Brakes —

TEST.

2.

Landing Gear Lever —

3.

Autopilot (if installed) —

DOWN.
OFF.

STARTING ENGINE
1.

Carburetor Heat —

COLD.

2.

Radios —

3.

Mags -- SWITCH to start.

ON.

BEFORE TAKEOFF
1.

Flight controls —

FREE and CORRECT.

2.

Fuel

3.

Elevator Trim —

4.

Electric Trim (if installed) —

5.

Radios and Avionics —

Quantity —

10. Autopilot —

CHECK.
SET for takeoff.
PREFLIGHT TEST.

SET.

OFF.
TAKEOFF

1.

Wing Flaps —

0°

2.

Carburetor Heat —

3.

Power —

4.

Elevator Control —

5.

Climb Speed —

6.

Brakes —

7.

Landing Gear —

OFF.

FULL THROTTLE and 2400 RPM.
LIFT NOSE WHEEL AT

7 0 KIAS.

80 KIAS (flaps UP).

APPLY momentarily when airborne.
RETRACT in climb out.
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ENROUTE CLIMB
1.

Airspeed —

80-100 KIAS.
CRUISE

1.

Power —

2100-2400 RPM.

2.

Elevator Trim —

ADJUST.

AUTOPILOT - PILOT'S OPERATING SUPPLEMENT
SECTION 1

General

The Flight Simulator Autopilot is a two axis automatic
flight control system that governs the position of the
ailerons and elevators to provide automatic roll and pitch
stability. The system also provides for tracking of VOR
radials selected by the OBS and NAV 1 radio.
The major components in the Flight Simulator system
consist of a single control unit mounted below the
artificial horizon and the directional gyro. The autopilot
is turned ON and OFF by moving the mouse arrow into the
AUTOPILOT indicator box and clicking.
SECTION 2

Limitations

The following autopilot limitations must be followed
during airplane operation.
1.
2.

Autopilot must be OFF for takeoff and landing.
Autopilot altitude is preselected at 4000' MSL

SECTION 3

Emergency Procedures

IN CASE OF AUTOPILOT MALFUNCTION
1.
2.

Airplane control stick - - OPERATE as required to
manually override the autopilot
AUTOPILOT Indicator to OFF to disconnect autopilot
system.

SECTION 4

Normal Procedures

BEFORE TAKEOFF AND LANDING:
1. AUTOPILOT indicator --- Ensure OFF
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IN-FLIGHT OPERATIONS:
1.
2.

The autopilot is configured to climb at a rate of 500
FPM only.
The autopilot is preconfigured to an altitude of 4000
MSL.

DESCENT:
1.

AUTOPILOT indicator to OFF

VOR COUPLING:
1.
2.

3.

The autopilot is configured to track VOR radials based
upon information in the OBS and the NAV 1 radio.
The airplane will automatically intercept and then
track the selected VOR course. The AUTOPILOT must be
turned OFF when the selected VOR course is changed, and
then turned ON again.
The desired course must be within 90 degrees of current
heading for the AUTOPILOT to work effectively.
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Pilot Responsibilities
Assume ultimate responsibility for flight safety and mission
effectiveness.
Control aircraft flight.
Copilot Responsibilities
Navigate.
Assume duties as assigned.
Aircrew Responsibilities
Monitor status of instruments and controls.
Arrive at destinations on schedule.
Communicate effectively with crew member.
Communicate effectively with ATC and operations.
Record information in mission log as required.
Provide assistance to each other.
Complete checklist procedures.
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Pilot Demographics
Crew Number: __________
Date:
__________
Crew Position:

(Pilot)

Condition Order:
Scenario Order:

(A,M)
(G,T)
(H)

(M,A)
(T,G)
(L)

(Copilot)

Please take a moment to complete the following questions.
Remember all information will remain confidential.
1.

Age:___ _______

2.

Gender:

3.

Ratings:

4.

What are your total flight hours? __________________

5.

Have you flown Microsoft Flight Simulator before?
(Yes)
(No)

6.

If you responded "Yes" to question 5, how many hours
have you flown Microsoft Flight Simulator? ___________

7.

Have you flown any other airplane flight simulators for
training purposes?
(Yes)
(No)

8.

If you responded "Yes" to question 7, how many hours
have you flown in other airplane flight simulators? ___

9.

Do you play video/computer games? (Yes)

10.

If you responded "Yes" to question 9, how many hours
per week do you engage video/computer games? (This does
not include Microsoft Flight Simulator) ______________

11.

How long have you known your crew mate? ____ (months)

(Male)

(Female)

(circle one)

Student
Private
Instrument
Commercial
CFI
CFII
ATP

(Circle ratings
that apply)

(No)

12. Have you flown with your crew mate before today?
(Yes)
(No)
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Post-experimental Questionnaire
Crew:______

Position:

(Pilot)

(Copilot)

We are interested in vour opinions concerning the experiment in which
you just completed.
Please take a moment to complete the following
questions.
Your responses will aid our effort in developing future
research.
Respond to each question by circling the number which best
represents your experience.
1. The experimental scenarios flown were representative of how
aircraft may be used in response to emergency situations.
0
not at
all

1

2
3
somewhat

4
5
6
moderately
representative

7
very

8
extremely
representative

2. The flight performance requirements (maintaining altitude, course,
and time requirements) of the scenarios accurately reflected issues
important in aviation.
0
not at
all
3.

6

1

2
3
somewhat

4
5
moderately
accurate

6

7
very

8
extremely
accurate

scenarios
7
very

accurately

8
extremely
accurate

1

2
3
somewhat

4
5
moderately
adequate

6

7
very

8
extremely
adequate

To what extent did you become complacent during the experimental
scenario in which the autopilot WAS used ?
0
not at
all

6.

4
5
moderately
accurate

The training flight scenario provided adequate practice for the
experimental scenarios.
0
not at
all

5.

2
3
somewhat

The decision making requirements of the
reflected issues important in aviation.
0
not at
all

4.

1

1

2
3
somewhat

4
5
moderately
complacent

6

7
very

8
extremely
complacent

To what extent did you become complacent during the experimental
scenario in which the autopilot was NOT used?
0
not at
all

1

2
3
somewhat

4
5
moderately
complacent

6

7
very

8
extremely
complacent
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7.

Have you
training?

received

any

cockpit
(Yes)

8. How many hours classroom time?
9.

resource

management

(No)
__________

COMMENTS:
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Rater: ________ Crew:
Start/Stop: ____________
Stmt:
DIMENSION
MISSION
ANALYSIS

SITUATIONAL
AUARENESS

DECISION
MAKING

LEADERSHIP

Time:

Leg:

CREW COORDINATION BEHAVIORS PER DIMENSION
MISSION ANALYSIS
Define tasks based on mission requirements.
Question data/ideas re: mission accomplishments.
Devise long/short term plans.
Id potential impact of unplanned events on mission.
Structure tasks, plans, & objectives.
Critique existing plans.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Note deviations.
Provide information in advance.
Demonstrate awareness of task performance of self/others.
Identify problems/potential problems.
Recognize need for action.
Demonstrate ongoing awareness of mission status.______

DECISION MAKING
Gather information before making decision.
Cross check information sources.
Identify alternatives & contingencies.
Anticipate consequences of decisions.
Provide rationale for decision.

LEADERSHIP
Determine tasks to be assigned.
Ask for input, discussed problem.
Focus crew attention to task.
Told crew member what to do.
Inform crew member of mission progress.
Provide a legitimate avenue of dissent.
Provide feedback to crew on performance.

ASSERTIVE
NESS

ADAPTABIL./
FLEXIBITY

COMMUNICA
TION

ASSERTIVENESS
Ask questions when uncertain.
Make suggestions.
State opinions on decisions/procedures.
Confront ambiguities and conflicts.
Advocate a specific course of action.

ADAPTABILITY/FLEXIBILITY
Alter behaviors to meet situational demands.
Receptive to other's ideas.
Step in and help others.
Alter flight plans to meet situational demands.

COMMUNICATION
Made no response.
Acknowledge communication.
Repeat information as required.
Ask for clarification of a communication.
Used standard terminology.
Provide information as required.
Provide information when asked.
Verbalize plans for procedures/maneuvers.
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Crew:_
Time:_
Rater:
MISSION ANALYSIS
Mission analysis involves the organization and assessment of
the information that pertains to the crew's assignment
(i.e., mission).
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
5 Complete skill

Crew members identify and prioritize the
tasks that must be performed to accomplish
the mission; anticipate the consequences of
unexpected changes in mission requirements;
review their plan of action to ensure that
the plan maximizes the resources.

4 Very much skill
3 Adequate ski 11

Crew members make short term plans, but
ususally do not anticipate future events;
outline the immediate tasks required for the
mission.

2 Some skill
1 Hardly any skill

Crew

Crew members are unable or unwilling to
determine what is important or relevant to
the accomplishment of the mission; assume the
first plan to accomplish the mission is the
best without considering alternatives.
Copilot

Pilot

Initial:
Final:
Comments:
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Crew:______
Time:______
Rater:_____
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Situational awareness refers to the maintenance of an
accurate perception of the environment, both internal and
external to the aircraft. The crew is oriented to mission
activities, flight status, and alternative courses of
action. This awareness may enchance the ability of the crew
members to take appropriate actions.
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
5 Complete skill

Crew members note inappropriate trends in
gauges before deviations occur; anticipate
the need for information and provide it in
advance; monitor the actions of themselves
and others for satisfactory performance; are
sensitive to changes in other crew members7
needs; are consistently aware of their
position and heading relative to ground
navigation aids.

4 Very much skill
3 Adequate skill

Crew members are sometimes aware of the
performance of other crew members; detect
deviations from normal readings, procedures
or tasks before gross deviations occur;
generally know the status of their mission
accomplishments; have a general idea of
aircraft position.

2 Some skill

Crew members fail to check their own or
other's actions to ensure that tasks are
properly executed; show confusion as to their
progress in accomplishing the mission;
typically provide information after an action
should have been taken; fails to detect
significant deviations from desired
parameters; are not aware of aircraft
position.

1 Hardly any

Initial:
Final:

Crew
_____

Copilot
_____

Pilot
_____

Comments:
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Crew:_
Time:_
Rater:
DECISION MAKING
Decision making refers to the processes by which logical and
sound judgements are made based on the information
available. This involves the method by which data is
collected and integrated into a strategy for task
performance.
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
5 Complete skill

Crew members anticipate the consequences of
decisions and related consequences in order
to prepare to take alternative actions;
consistently consider several factors before
making a decision; verify information by
cross checking sources before making a final
decision.

4 Very much skill
3 Adequate ski 11

Crew members generally acquire all critical
information needed for immediate decision
making; typically are prepared for immediate
actions that must be taken.

2 Some skill

1 Hardly any ski 11

Crew

Crew members are rarely prepared to make
immediate decisions when unanticipated events
occur; fail to seek information that may
enhance decisions; fail to consider the
consequences of their decisions.
Copilot

Pilot

Initial:
Final:
Comments:
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Crew:_
Time:_
Rater:
LEADERSHIP
Leadership involves the direction, organization, and support
of other crew members.
It can be shown by crew members
other than individuals with formal authority.
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
5 Complete skill

Crew members quickly assess a situation when
the crew appears overwhelmed and structure
the activities of others by assigning tasks
or by focusing attention to a task to be
performed;
identify and delay non-critical
duties until low workload periods; facilitate
crew performance by giving feedback without
creating conflict.

4 Very much skill
3 Adequate ski 11

Crew members provide direction only when a
problem occurs; inform other members that
they are performing a task poorly rather than
providing specific guidance; provide task
oriented focus only when responding to a
deviation.

2 Some ski 11
1 Hardly any skill

Crew

Crew members leave others to govern their own
behaviors by providing little feedback when
the correct course of action is unclear;
create an atmosphere in which disagreements
are not tolerated or confronted; discount the
ideas of other crew members.
Copilot

Pilot

Initial:
Final:
Comments:
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Crew:_
Time:_
Rater:
ASSERTIVENESS
Assertiveness involves the offer of opinions or beliefs to
other crew members, particularily when the the situation is
unclear or the offer is unsolicited. This may also refer to
an admission of uncertainity on the part of a crew member.
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
5 Complete skill

Crew members present information essential to
proper execution of tasks, even when conflict
is present; speak up when they believe a
particular course of action is best; display
a willingness to seek assistance rather than
struggle and make mistakes; directly confront
differences of opinion in a positive manner.

4 Very much ski 11
3 Adequate skill

Crew members admit they need help when their
need is obvious; provides nonjudgemental
prompts in response to deviations from
desired flight parameters.

2 Some skill
1 Hardly any skill

Crew

Crew members fail to offer suggestions or
assistance when the situation is unclear; are
unwilling to ask for help even when it is
available; withhold critical pieces of
information from other crew members; make
extraneous sarcastic remarks when deviations
from desired performance are noted.
Copilot

Pilot

Initial:
Final:
Comments:
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Crew:______
Time:______
Rater:_____
ADAPTABILITY/FLEXIBILITY
Adaptability/flexibility refers to the willingness of crew
members to change their behaviors or plans to accommodate
the situation.
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
5 Complete skill

Crew members assist others that are having
difficulty by redistributing workload when
possible; easily adjust to changes based on
new information or demands; anticipate if a
crew member will need help prior to an event.

4 Very much skill
3 Adequate skill

Crew members do not provide help until they
are asked; provide assistance in accordance
with their assigned duties.

2 Some skill
1 Hardly any ski 11

Crew

As time constraints increase, crew members
are unwilling to concede a position; display
an unwillingness to attempt to eliminate
overload conditions for others; are reluctant
to alter plans based new instructions or
information.
Copilot

Pilot

Initial:
Final:
Comments:
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Crew:_
Time:_
Rater:
COMMUNICATION
Communication involves the exchange of information between
crew members in a manner that enhances performance.
Frequently the purpose of communication is to prevent
misunderstandings by clarifying or acknowledging critical
information.
Behavioral Indicators of Skill Level
5 Complete skill

Crew members ensure that messages are
understood by requesting clarification when
confused or by repeating information; keep
each other informed of the current status of
tasks and of their future intentions; utilize
standard language and provide redundancy cues
to reduce the likelihood of errors.

4 Very much skill
3 Adequate skill

Crew members acknowledge decisions made;
provide information when requested; convey
information essential to effective task
performance.

2 Some skill
1 Hardly any skill

Crew

Crew members rarely acknowledge information
offered or requested; fail to request
clarification of an unclear message;
typically take actions or make decisions
without informing other crew members.
Copilot

Pilot

Initial:
Final:
Comments:
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BEHAVIORAL SUMMARY SCALES
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Mission Analysis Guidelines
Behavioral Summary of "Complete Skill11 in Mission Analysis
Crew members identify and prioritize the tasks that must be
performed to accomplish the mission; anticipate the
consequences of unexpected changes in mission requirements;
review their plan of action to ensure that the plan
maximizes the resources.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill" in Mission
Analysis:
After receiving mission instructions from Operations
during the first leg of the mission, the copilot
indicates that they should first assess the usefulness
of the supplies, determine their location, and then
plan a flight path.
The crew notes that if Operations reroutes their flight
course again they may need to reassess their supply
priorities.
After deciding on a flight path to obtain the supplies,
the crew scrutinizes the plan to confirm that the most
supply points will be obtained.
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill" in Mission Analysis
Crew members make short term plans, but ususally do not
anticipate future events; outline the immediate tasks
required for the mission
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in Mission
Analysis:
During the first leg of their mission, the crew
identifies the usefulness of the supplies and plans to
obtain the top 5 or 6; however, they do not consider
that the location of the supplies may affect their
ability to obtain them quickly.
The copilot indicates that the crew must fly from Meigs
to Midway because of poor weather in addition to
developing a crew ranking of supply usefulness.
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Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Any Skill11 in Mission Analysis
Crew members are unable or unwilling to determine what is
important or relevant to the accomplishment of the mission;
assume the first plan to accomplish the mission is the best
without considering alternatives.
Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any Skill" in Mission
Analysis:
Throughout the mission the crew does not attempt to
clarify their confusion about the requirements to
accomplish the mission successfully.
The crew develops only one flight plan to deliver
supplies; they never examine alternative routes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

171
Situational Awareness Guidelines
Behavioral Summary of "Complete Skill11 in Situational
Awareness
Crew members note inappropriate trends in gauges before
deviations occur; anticipate the need for information and
provide it in advance; monitor the actions of themselves and
others for satisfactory performance; are sensitive to
changes in other crew members' needs; are consistently aware
of their position and heading relative to ground navigation
aids.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill" in Situational
Awareness:
The pilot indicates that the altitude is beginning to
drop very slightly in relation to the use of the
autopilot at slow speeds.
Two to three miles before passing over the VOR, the
copilot informs the pilot what the next heading will
be.
The copilot notes that they will be reach the next
station crossing 2 minutes early unless the pilot
decreases airspeed to 100 knots.
Because the copilot is aware the pilot is having
difficulty maintaining altitude, the copilot does not
attempt to question her about her ranking of the
supplies until the altitude is established.
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill" in Situational
Awareness
Crew members are sometimes aware of the performance of other
crew members; detect deviations from normal readings,
procedures or tasks before gross deviations occur; generally
know the status of their mission accomplishments; have a
general idea of aircraft position.
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in Situational
Awareness:
The pilot notices when the copilot has input an
incorrect frequency, especially if she needs to make
the radio call immediately.
The crew notes that they haven't put the landing gear
up before they reach 1500 feet.
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After a moments consideration, the copilot indicates
that they have only picked up two supplies because no
supplies were located at their first two station
crossings.
Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Anv Skill11 in Situational
Awareness
Crew members fail to check their own or other's actions to
ensure that tasks are properly executed; show confusion as
to their progress in accomplishing the mission; typically
provide information after an action should have been taken;
fail to detect significant deviations from desired
parameters; are not aware of aircraft position.
Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any Skill" in Situation
Awareness:
The crew engages in several games of "tic-tac-toe" and
fail to notice that they have lost 2000 feet in
altitude.
The crew spends five minutes attempting to determine
how many more supplies they should obtain.
After the aircraft passes over the VOR and in response
to a query from the pilot, the copilot tells the pilot
what the new heading should be.
The crew notices that they have flown several miles in
the wrong direction.
The copilot consistently asks the pilot where they are
on the map.
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Decision Making Guidelines
Behavioral Summary of "Complete Skill11 in Decision Making
Crew members anticipate the consequences of decisions and
related consequences in order to prepare to take alternative
actions; consistently consider several factors before making
a decision; verify information by cross checking sources
before making a final decision.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill" in Decision
Making:
The crew realizes that if they fly a 360 degree circle
to slow their arrival time, they may actually arrive
later than the designated time.
Before deciding between two flight routes of equal
value, the crew considers the distance in addition to
the usefulness of the supplies.
The crew compares their individual supply rankings
before finalizing their crew ranking.
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill" in Decision Making
Crew members generally acquire all critical information
needed for immediate decision making; typically are prepared
for immediate actions that must be taken.
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in Decision
Making:
The pilot attempts to identify why the distance is
increasing on the DME by first asking the copilot if
the correct NAV radio is on, then asking if the correct
TO-FROM indication is shown on the OBI and if the
appropriate NAV frequency has been input.
When the stall warning sounds as the aircraft
approaches the station, the pilot immediately increases
the throttle and after verifying a safe airspeed, the
copilot brings the flaps up.
Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Anv Skill" in Decision Making
Crew members are rarely prepared to make immediate decisions
when unanticipated events occur; fail to seek information
that may enhance decisions; fail to consider the
consequences of their decisions.
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Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any Skill" in Decision
Making:
After the crew is reminded that they may not fly over
the same airfield twice, they have difficulty
identifying another supply point; they do not reach a
decision until they have flown several minutes past
their immediate destination.
The crew declares the autopilot completely inoperative
without reviewing the supplemental autopilot procedure
checklist. Also, when forced with a location
incongruity, the crew choses to disregard other
information sources that may validate their position
(e.g., call to Center, use of alternate NAVAIDS).
The crew does not discuss how their decision to
maintain the cruise speed indicated on the checklist
will compromise their ability to reach each station
crossing at the appropriate time.
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Assertiveness Guidelines
Behavioral Summary of "Complete Skill11 in Assertiveness
Crew members present information essential to proper
execution of tasks, even when conflict is present; speak up
when they believe a particular course of action is best;
display a willingness to seek assistance rather than
struggle and make mistakes; directly confront differences of
opinion in a positive manner.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill" in
Assertiveness:
After reaching their first station crossing three
minutes early, the pilot reminds the copilot that one
of their goals is to reach check points at the
designated time, even if it means that the cruise speed
indicated on the checklist cannot be maintained.
The copilot recommends that they gain better control of
the aircraft before they begin to decide on the crew
ranking of disaster supplies.
The pilot admits that he doesn't understand the
instructions for obtaining the supplies and requests
the copilot explain them.
The copilot notes that their idea of supply usefulness
appears to be totally opposite and suggests they
discuss their rationale.
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill" in Assertiveness
Crew members admit they need help when their need is
obvious; provides nonjudgemental prompts in response to
deviations from desired flight parameters.
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in
Assertiveness:
After repeated attempts to calculate the needed
airspeed, the copilot indicates that he's forgotten how
to perform that task.
After the pilot makes several unsuccessful attempts to
fly over the VOR, the copilot recommends that she
regain altitude before making another attempt.
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Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Anv Skill11 in Assertiveness
Crew members fail to offer suggestions or assistance when
the situation is unclear; are unwilling to ask for help even
when it is available; withhold critical pieces of
information from other crew members; make extraneous
sarcastic remarks when deviations from desired performance
are noted.
Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any Skill" in
Assertiveness;
The copilot sits silently and makes no suggestions
while he waits for the pilot to determine their route
of flight.
The copilot has forgotten how to calculate airspeeds,
but does not ask for assistance.
The copilot refuses to switch the DME to distance at
the request of the pilot.
After noting that the copilot is having difficulty
computing ground speed, the pilot comments that "a
monkey can compute required ground speed faster than
you can".
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Leadership Guidelines
Behavioral summary of "Complete Skill11 in Leadership
Crew members quickly assess a situation when the crew
appears overwhelmed and structure the activities of others
by assigning tasks or by focusing attention to a task to be
performed; identify and delay non-critical duties until low
workload periods; facilitate crew performance by giving
feedback without creating conflict.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill" in Leadership:
When the copilot appears overwhelmed with new supply
delivery instructions, the pilot recommends that they
calm down first, ensure they are on the correct
heading, and then worry about what supplies to deliver.
The copilot suggests that they wait to develop a flight
plan until after the pilot has the aircraft stabilized.
The pilot explains that although the copilot is
consistently inputting the correct frequencies for
radio calls, the pilot needs to know when that action
has been completed.
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill" in Leadership
Crew members provide direction only when a problem occurs;
inform other members that they are performing a task poorly
rather than providing specific guidance; provides task
oriented focus only when responding to a deviation.
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in Leadership:
The pilot announces that because of the high workload
present at that time, all nonessential tasks will be
disregarded.
The pilot indicates that the airspeeds the copilot has
calculated typically make the crew late to their next
destination.
The copilot notes that they are 500 feet below assigned
altitude and directs the pilot to increase altitude
back to 4000 feet.
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Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Anv Skill11 in Leadership
Crew members leave others to govern their own behaviors by
providing little feedback when the correct course of action
is unclear; create an atmosphere in which disagreements are
not tolerated or confronted; discount the ideas of others.
Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any Skill" in
Leadership:
Although stall warnings keep sounding and the pilot is
obviously having difficulty, the copilot does not offer
any suggestions as to how to maintain altitude.
Throughout the flight, the pilot repeatedly states that
he is the pilot and therefore makes the decisions.
The pilot ignores any suggestions about aircraft
handling that the copilot makes.
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Adaptability/Flexibility Guidelines
Behavioral Summary of "Complete Skill11 in
Adaptab i1itv/Flexib i1itv
Crew members assist others that are having difficulty by
redistributing workload when possible; easily adjust to
changes based on new information or demands; anticipate if a
crew member will need help prior to an event.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill" in
Adaptability/ Flexibility;
The pilot begins making the radio calls after he
notices the copilot is preoccupied with other duties.
After planning a route to pick up supplies, Operations
instructs the crew to fly to a different supply point;
the copilot quickly identifies the new heading and VOR
frequency, thereby enabling the pilot to modify his
flight path.
Because the autopilot is unreliable at speeds below 80
knots, the copilot begins to monitor the altitude more
closely when the aircraft is flying below 85 knots.
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill" in
Adaptability/Flexibility
Crew members do not provide help until they are asked;
provide assistance in accordance with their assigned duties.
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in
Adaptability/ Flexibility:
The copilot is aware the pilot is having difficulty
trimming the aircraft, but helps him adjust it only
after the pilot requests help.
The copilot calculates the needed airspeed and informs
the pilot.
Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Anv Skill" in
Adaptability/Flexibility
As time constraints increase, crew members are unwilling to
concede a position; display an unwillingness to attempt to
eliminate overload conditions for others; are reluctant to
alter plans based new instructions or information.
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Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any Skill" in
Adaptability/ Flexibility:
The crew must inform Operations of their newly
developed flight plan before reaching Midway; however,
they continue to argue about the best course of action
and are late in calling Operations with the new plan.
The pilot merely laughs as he comments that the copilot
seems to be having difficulty completing his duties.
The pilot first instructs the copilot to dial up
Operations and then changes his instruction to Center.
The copilot grumbles about having to change what is
already dialed in. The pilot has to direct the copilot
a second time before the copilot acts.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

181
Communication Guidelines
Behavioral Summary of "Complete Skill11 in Communication
Crew members ensure that messages are understood by
requesting clarification when confused or by repeating
information; keep each other informed of the current status
of tasks and of their future intentions; utilize standard
language and provide redundancy cues to reduce the
likelihood of errors.
Behavioral examples of "Complete Skill” in
Communication:
When the copilot tells the pilot to turn to a specific
heading to get back on course, the pilot repeats the
heading and then requests the copilot confirm the
heading.
The copilot informs the pilot that he's input the
correct nav frequency and will change the heading prior
to the VOR.
When providing heading information, the copilot also
provides the necessary direction of turn (e.g., "Left
turn to a heading of 236 degrees”).
Behavioral Summary of "Adequate Skill” in Communication
Crew members acknowledge decisions made; provide information
when requested; convey information essential to effective
task performance.
Behavioral examples of "Adequate Skill" in
Communication:
After the copilot indicates that he is turning off the
autopilot, the pilot replies "roger".
After Center reports the crew's expected time to the
next VOR, the copilot informs the pilot of the correct
airspeed to fly in order to arrive on time.
Behavioral Summary of "Hardly Anv Skill" in Communication
Crew members rarely acknowledge information offered or
requested; fail to request clarification of an unclear
message; typically take actions or make decisions without
informing other crew members.
Behavioral examples of "Hardly Any" in Communication:
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Although the copilot provides numerous directions as to
heading and airspeed, the pilot does not acknowledge
his instructions.
The pilot issues an incomplete command regarding the
communication frequency; the copilot does not ask him
to repeat the message.
After determining that the speed of the aircraft should
be changed, the copilot adjusts the throttle without
notifying the pilot.
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